
The Bush Doctrine: A Preemptive Path to Peace or a Recipe for Perpetual War?

A Symposium

In early April, a few weeks after the war in Iraq began, American Experiment president Mitch Pearlstein asked a number of friends and colleagues in Minnesota and across the country to discuss what they thought of Bush administration foreign policy, specifically the president's campaign against terror. Thirty-four writers from a variety of backgrounds accepted the invitation, responding to the following setup (which is abbreviated here) and several questions.

Much has been debated and written since 9/11—especially since it became clear President George W. Bush was determined to excise Saddam Hussein—about how aggressive the United States ought to be in fighting terrorism around the world. How preemptive should we be in safeguarding the lives of American citizens and other innocents? How “unilateral”? How intent should we be in introducing (“imposing”?) American values in places where they may not be initially cherished? To what degree should American foreign policy be animated, not just by concessions to realpolitik might, but by loftier visions of what we take to be fundamentally right?

Two integrated wellsprings of this debate are of particular interest. The first is the “National Security Strategy of the United States,” issued by the Bush administration in September 2002, which asserts things like the following. (The first paragraph is from the president's cover letter; the second, from the

statement itself.)

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. [The full national security document can be found at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html.]

A second source of grist for debate is a growing body of commentary by and about leaders and analysts known as "neoconservatives" (also sometimes called "neo-Reaganites"). Put aside the fact that the term "neoconservative" has morphed from its original meaning a generation ago, when it referred to former liberals who, in Irving Kristol's wonderful phrase, had been "mugged by reality." Evidently, the word, which initially had a large domestic policy component, now more specifically refers to advocates of a "muscular, activist program for eliminating threats, protecting U.S. interests, and spreading

American values” in international matters. “Neo-cons say that their movement . . . presents the United States with a historic opportunity to spread democracy and free enterprise.” Both of these descriptions are by Eric Black, a very good reporter with the Minneapolis-based *Star Tribune*.

All of which leads to questions like these. Please address them (or some portion of them) in any way you see fit.

What do you think of the wisdom and potential effectiveness of the Bush administration’s “muscular” and “activist” foreign policy, as played out in Iraq certainly, but not just there?

Will the Bush Doctrine make the United States and world safer from terror?

Or will it, as many critics claim, prove a “recipe for perpetual war”?

Defining Self Defense

Joshua Borenstein

When is a preemptive strike an act of aggression and when is it an act of self-defense? How can anyone be certain that an enemy will attack until they do? Might the enemy back down? These are the overriding moral questions and arguments concerning the war on Iraq.

A few months ago a friend of mine said, “Based upon the Bush Doctrine, North Korea has grounds to launch a preemptive strike against the United States.” Why? I asked. Well, the argument went, if the United States is threatening them (because of the nuclear situation), then they are entitled to a defensive preemptive strike on the United States. If it’s good for Bush, it’s good for everybody else. Here, the

critics say, we see the Bush Doctrine at work and failing miserably.

The way I see it, the second criticism is an empty argument, nothing but rhetoric. The Bush Doctrine does not say that any threat may be eliminated by a preemptive strike. It does say that we will strike preemptively and not sit and wait to be hit first. Iraq was a threat, was given a chance to stop that threat, and chose to ignore that opportunity. The United States was left with a preemptive strike as its only sure way of stopping the threat. There was no other choice.

Two conditions are required for invocation of the Bush Doctrine. First, the problem must be a direct threat to the United States. Second, the United States must feel it has no other solution to the problem. Defined as such, the United States would not be able to

use the Bush Doctrine to solve the Bosnia crises or to end the China-Taiwan dispute. The United States would not use it simply to liberate Iraq, unless there was an intrinsic clear and present danger.

How do we determine whether another country is a true threat? What must that country do to force us to act in self-defense (which is precisely what the Bush Doctrine is). Is it self-defense only after being attacked? Can we use aggressive force because we have assumed that we are about to be hit?

What do the Torah and Judaism teach? The Talmud (Sanhedrin 72, based on Exodus 22:1) discusses the act of self-defense of an individual in his home. The teaching is clear: if an armed robber breaks into my house, I must kill him to stop him, provided I can't stop him by injuring him. That is true even if he never fires a shot, even if he never points a weapon at me. Why? Because if he comes into my house armed, I must assume he is willing to kill. That is why he is armed. The burden of proof is on the intruder to prove he will not hurt the owner, not on the defender of his house to prove he is in danger.

Why don't you have to prove that the armed robber was going to kill you? The answer is simple: the proof may be the homeowner's death. Therefore, the Torah says the proof is on the perpetrator who has put himself into this situation. He must face the consequences.

If a country possesses dangerous weapons, threatens to use them to attack the United States, and is making alliances with our enemies, then we

have the right to defend ourselves. They have crossed the line by becoming the perpetrator. Don't threaten if you don't want to face the consequences.

Case Study One: In 1967, Egypt led the Arab world in massing men and weapons on Israel's borders, threatening war, making alliances for war, even celebrating the victory before the war started. To their shock, Israel shot first before Egypt said "play ball." For Egypt to later claim it was "attacked by Israel" is a joke. It was a clear act of self-defense, not aggression. Many believed Israel was certain to have been wiped out. Instead, it secured victory over an enemy that was about to pull the trigger.

Case Study Two: In 1973, Israel allowed its neighbors to line up for war and instead of acting in prevention, waited for the first shot before responding. The country was nearly lost because of that decision.

In the global fight against terrorists and rogue nations, who can argue with the soundness of the Bush Doctrine?

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This Time It's Personal

Tony Bouza

In criminal matters motive is central. Intent is woven into the fabric of practically every serious crime. It is also at the core of most human interactions. Since nations are collections of humans, their actions can also be understood in terms of motives.

America fought the twentieth century's greatest evil and crushed the

Nazis. Nothing compares to this heroic act, notwithstanding this administration's absurd comparisons of Hussein to Hitler. We've also fought the forces of the Evil Empire and struck back hard at those who injured us. Our motives—even in Vietnam—were always transparently and obviously pure. We sought nothing for ourselves.

We've tolerated tyrants of all types and descriptions. Latin America was a hothouse of bizarre tyrannies for much of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union was a daily menace to us for almost half a century. China continues to be a danger. Africa has long been a petri dish of grotesque abuses and regimes—with the Congo's bloodletting being the largest human toll (at about 3 million dead, and counting) since World War II. Idi Amin and Mobutu Sese Seko come to mind as prime examples. And there's Mommarr Al Qadaffi.

We've wrung our hands over nuclear proliferations. Some—the United Kingdom and France—we didn't mind. Others—the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and India—we couldn't stop. And one—Israel—we deliberately ignored. North Korea falls into the camp of those we hope to dissuade.

Why Iraq?

It isn't about oil. The Gulf War was. But, there isn't any crisis—and there hasn't been in decades.

It isn't about evil. Or are we on a mission to wipe out evil universally?

It isn't about weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, or nuclear. We haven't found any and we had, properly, coerced Iraq into large

and effective United Nations inspections. Let's remember that U.N. inspectors discovered and dismantled more weapons than the first Gulf War destroyed.

Weakening the one international body working for global peace was one of the dividends of this new policy of war.

So what was the intent behind our invasion?

Tony Blair was there when President Bush said, "the U.N. will play a vital role in Iraq." I wonder how Prime Minister Blair feels now that the United Nations was left behind.

We were there, during the debates of 2000, when George Bush made a solemn promise about nation building. The postscript arrived with the April 23, 2003, edition of the *New York Times*, which reported, "as it (the United States) moves into the nation building phase of its Iraq program. . . ." Familiar?

Following the Gulf War, ex-president Bush (you can call someone "ex," rather than "former" if they've been dethroned) visited the Middle East. A plot to assassinate him was interdicted by intelligence forcers (ours and others). Saddam Hussein was behind the attempt.

Within the past year the current President Bush blurted out a sentence he hasn't used since, "He tried to kill my dad."

It's personal.

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If We Don't Lead, Someone Else Will

Norm Coleman

We sit at a unique moment in history. Not since the sixteenth century when the Spanish Empire was at its zenith has one nation laid legitimate claim to being the world's only superpower. We have taken advantage of this historic opportunity by striking a decisive blow against tyranny and terrorism in Iraq, and now we are playing a leading role in the birth of a new country and a new century of hope for freedom and security.

We must accept the moral responsibility that our power gives us. Our nation, more than any other, was born from eternal values—namely that God endowed all people with unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But as much as we would like to believe it, those ideals will not sweep the globe and enforce themselves. Somebody has to do it.

The truth is that if we do not lead, someone else will, and the world is much better off with our leadership than with anyone else's. The burdens of leadership have not fallen upon us accidentally; we have earned them. We have earned them by opening up our borders to the rest of the world for trade, investment, and immigration. We have earned them by spending great sums of money on defense and foreign aid while others sought protection in our shadow. We have earned them by using our power to deliver the world from two world wars and preserving it through the Cold War. We have earned them by remaining true to our

ideals of religious, economic, and political freedom. This freedom, in turn, has set the example for the rest of the world as to what constitutes a fair and humane government. It allows the creation of a culture that captures the world's imagination. It produces most of the technology the rest of the world uses to compete with us. And it generates many of the social trends that other people find so appealing.

These are not the accomplishments of a single race or class. Throughout our nation's history, a diverse mix of people has found refuge and promise on our shores. They have, in turn, come to embrace the ideals that created that climate and they have sought to extend them to other parts of the world. That is and will remain the impetus for our leadership.

We should not feel guilty about trying to spread these benefits to the rest of the world. Much of the opposition to our attempts comes not from the people in foreign countries but from their repressive governments, whose claims to power are dubious at best. Our ideals and principles represent a direct threat to governments such as North Korea and Iran, and they recognize it.

If others can suggest better ways of extending liberty and economic prosperity let them come forward and implement them. But in the absence of viable alternatives, the United States is not obligated to sit helplessly by and wait for events to overtake us.

In just the last few decades, millions died in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in the Congo, in North Korea and yes, in Iraq.

But in the name of containment, the United States did not intervene; we just isolated the dictators. In this post-9/11 world it is clear that you don't contain terrorism.

Some say we can't be the world's policeman. But, what's wrong with being a policeman? And as the world's only superpower, we can do a lot of things we could never do before. We don't use our power to gain oil wells or diamond mines or farmlands. We use our power to free people from tyranny and to establish democracy.

Abraham Lincoln said, "Let us have faith that right makes might. And in that faith, let us do our duty as we understand it." For some that duty is to wear a uniform. For others it is to teach young people, or provide jobs, or build up the spiritual life of people. For all of us it is our duty is to support our commander in chief, our military, and their families to the utmost. And Americans will do their duty.

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The Patient Cowboy

Kimberly Crockett

The Bush foreign policy was conceived on September 11, 2001. The attacks clarified our duties and identified our enemies. While U.S. foreign policy, absent the attacks, would have reflected President Bush's conservatism, it would not have been the "muscular, activist program" that it is today. Is it a wise and effective response to the Age of Terror?

The Bush administration's response to September 11 has been remarkably measured. If Bush is a cowboy, he certainly is a patient one. I remember how many people wanted to bomb somebody following that tragic morning. Many Americans felt impatient with our lack of response. Why not hit back and hit back hard?

Instead, Bush assembled a first-rate team of advisers, many of whom were already cabinet members, to secure the nation's domestic safety and plan our military response. The president boldly told the world, "You are either with us, or you are with the terrorists."

Bush then sent troops to close bin Laden's "Camp Afghanistan," an exporter of terrorism. Order has been restored in Afghanistan; its people now have a decent chance to determine their future, free of Russian, Taliban, and Al-Qaida thugs. Only the U.S. military, backed by a determined president, could deliver such effective results.

Next, Iraq was identified as the beligerent most likely to create terror in America while destabilizing the Mideast. Yet, we did not attack until we had exhausted all diplomatic alternatives.

After a few weeks, coalition forces defeated Iraq's dictatorship, while carefully protecting its people and infrastructure. The coalition is a liberating force; it did not set out to bring Iraq to its knees. This "gentleman's" approach to war put soldiers at greater risk, but better ensured that we will win the peace. Again, only the United States—not the United Nations—could deliver these results.

We can criticize the seemingly endless diplomatic wrangling leading up to the invasion of Iraq. But our tough diplomatic stance, however dragged out negotiations became, gave us extremely valuable information—which countries we can count on and which ones we can't.

We certainly have reason to complain about domestic security issues. But there has not been one successful terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11. Overall, the Bush administration has acted wisely and to great effect.

Has Bush made the United States and the world safer from terror? Absolutely. We have just demonstrated the long reach of our military and economic might in the most telegraphed declaration of war in our nation's history. We are so powerful that we can tell our enemy that we are coming to get them months before we plan to go. The world is on notice that we are not afraid to fight.

The doctrine of peace through strength is not new. Rebuilding an enemy nation after defeat is not new either. What is new is this aggressively self-defensive posture; the greater willingness to take preemptive actions when we feel threatened. Will we find ourselves mired in perpetual war? It actually makes war less likely. And we are already seeing impressive dividends.

Negotiations with North Korea, made possible by a heretofore-reluctant China, have begun. India and Pakistan are cooperating. Syria is handing over

Iraqi officials and calling for the removal of weapons of mass destruction. The international community has arrested or killed hundreds of terrorists. All of this adds up to a safer, more stable world where military action is less likely because no one wants to be next on our hit list.

We cannot effectively control the flow of technology to our enemies. We can, however, address some of the causes of radicalism while taming our more dangerous foes. It will be very costly, but it could yield immense benefits. The Age of Terror need not defeat America's unique optimism about the goodness of human nature; it could in fact enlarge the world's experience of peace.

The most untested premise of the Bush Doctrine is the radical idea that all people deserve and desire freedom—even Afghans and Arabs. "The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity." The Bush Doctrine does not discriminate against people long accustomed to being shoved around by tyrants. If Bush's hopeful vision succeeds, the world will look very different in just a generation. Maybe young Afghans and Arabs will no longer feel the lure of terror because they'll be too busy building democracy and prosperity at home. Isn't it worth a try?

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Successful policing, good advice, and economic repair

Bryan Dowd

Can a muscular, activist foreign policy that promotes “American values” abroad and uses preemptive force when necessary, substantially reduce attacks on our citizens? Clearly, the proper mix of policing, economic assistance, and non-involvement in foreign affairs depends on the root causes of the problem we are trying to address. The root causes I have heard proposed for the 9/11 attacks are: objection to U.S. military presence, particularly in Saudi Arabia; objections to American values, ranging from materialism to support for Israel; and frustration in the Arab world that stems from the perception of being inconsequential in world affairs. Can the Bush Doctrine, or any other strategy, address these root causes?

Total abandonment of the policing option would be irresponsible in the face of immediate threats, so some physical presence of the United States in the Arab world is likely to continue under any strategy. American values, including religious and political freedom, protection of private property, and many of the unfortunate excesses that can accompany those freedoms also are non-negotiable, as is our support for Israel. Those who oppose the existence of Israel will get the policing option. For others, the Bush administration has expressed hope that regime change in Iraq might produce new opportunities to reshape the Arab-Israeli conflict. Time will tell.

What about the perception of being inconsequential? The criminals of 9/11 were not lashing out at an enemy who believed they were wrong. They were lashing out at an enemy who didn't care whether they were wrong or not. Murder through self-annihilation is the act of a person who believes that otherwise, he or she is inconsequential. Application of brute force can add to the perception of being inconsequential, even when applied to a vicious dictator who slaughtered members of your own family. For the subset of Iraqis who were inconsequential in the struggle for their own freedom, our efforts on their behalf may produce further despair.

I have read that in the twenty-first century, the politics of identity will replace the politics of ideology. In fact, the two are inseparable. The great failed ideologies of the twentieth century were founded on lies about identity and human worth. Fascists defined human worth in terms of national or ethnic identity. Communists (simply economic fascists) defined human worth in terms of economic class. The ideologies destined for failure in the twenty-first century have made the same mistake.

Three fundamental concepts of human worth are at work in the world. First, that it is an illusion. Second, that it is earned or granted. Third, that it is intrinsic and unassailable. The first two are transient. They lead to poverty, despair, and atrocities because they are false. The United States was founded on the third concept.

Can the Bush Doctrine address the despair of inconsequence? There are three ways to help those who suffer from it. The first is to treat such people with genuine respect. The second is to help them become materially consequential by developing political and economic systems that reward sound public and private investment, creativity, and hard work. The Bush administration has demonstrated genuine commitment to these two approaches. Unfortunately, neither may be sufficient. The third approach is to substitute an intrinsic and unassailable concept of human worth for transient concepts. Being created in the image of God, whose self-sacrificial love reconciled our imperfection with his perfection, works well for one-third of the world's inhabitants. Recent history suggests few viable alternatives. Islam certainly was not the answer for the 9/11 hijackers. Statistically, it appears to have been a risk factor. Hindus relegate huge segments of their population to non-personhood. Atheistic governments killed 100 million of their own citizens in less than fifty years. These results are not ancient history. They are the status quo.

Absent an intrinsic and unassailable source of human worth, democracy becomes mob-rule and constitutions are bent to the political whims of the day. Iron-fisted dictators simultaneously are revered and hated. Despair follows naturally. It can happen in Iraq, India, or Iowa.

Treating people with respect is easy. Promoting education, the rule of law, and free markets is easy. Even policing

is conceptually easy compared to imbuing a genuine sense of self-worth and concern for others in people who believe they are intrinsically inconsequential. The Bush Doctrine is likely to provide successful policing, good advice, and the resources for economic repair. The harder repair will fall to others, and our future may hinge on their success.

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Draining the Swamp

Ricardo Egozcue

It is no coincidence that apart from North Korea, all of the states classed as rogues and sponsors of terrorism—Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, and Sudan—are Muslim. During the Cold War, America's nuclear deterrent could motivate communist dictators to exercise rationality in their decision-making and temper their ambitions. Atheist-communists didn't have a paradise with seventy-plus virgins awaiting them if their attempts to spread communism triggered a nuclear war. However, as 9/11 and the past two years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict show, there is a disturbing willingness by some in the Arab world to use suicide attacks that result in the slaughter of thousands of innocent civilians to advance their goals.

The threats America faces today demand a more "muscular" and "activist" approach than it used during the Cold War. Deterrence does not alter the incentives of those who believe

they will be rewarded in an afterlife if they detonate a nuclear device in Washington, D.C. Containment will not stop a terrorist determined to infect himself and carry a biological agent into downtown Chicago.

It is disturbing that terrorism, hatred for America, and Islamic fundamentalism are being nurtured by a number of “moderate” and “friendly” Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, secular socialist states like Syria, and openly fundamentalist regimes like Iran. Initially, the goal of these failed Arab states was to channel the frustration of the “Arab street” and divert attention from the lack of economic opportunity and the corruption of their regimes. Over time, the reality is that the policies of these failed governments created the terrorist organizations that have become a threat not only to Israel and America but also to themselves. A muscular and activist policy may not deter or contain a suicide bomber, but there is reason to believe that such an approach will alter the behavior of the regimes that created the dangers we face today.

During the 1990s a perception of American weakness only emboldened terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and rogue states like North Korea. It is no coincidence that bin Laden continually cited President Clinton’s withdrawal from Somalia after eighteen American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. The Somalia retreat, bin Laden concluded, showed that America could not stomach the loss of life that accompanies war. In addition, the Clinton’s administration response to events—the 1993

World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 twin embassy bombings, Iraq’s expulsion of U.N. weapon inspectors, and the 2000 USS *Cole* attack—was to either treat these events as domestic criminal acts left for U.S. courts to adjudicate or to shoot \$2 million missiles that made no real chink in the armor of our enemies.

It also did not help matters when the Clinton administration allowed former President Carter to subject the United States to a policy of blackmail, giving the North Koreans food and two nuclear reactors in hope of stopping their nuclear program. Sadly, Carter and Clinton failed to understand that without a deal that would verify North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, Pyongyang was likely to continue its nuclear program, and unlike the Soviets, would be willing to sell such nuclear technology to other rogues such as Syria and Libya, or worse, to terrorist networks such as Al-Qaida.

Afghanistan and Iraq have made the threat of American military might credible again. With the fall of Saddam and the Taliban, it is foreseeable that secular states such as Syria and Libya will have a moment of clarity that will force them to reduce or eliminate sponsorship of terrorism. In the case of Iran, a free Iraq is likely to embolden a pro-Western population to effectuate regime-change against the ayatollahs that govern them. Without state funding provided by governments like Saddam’s, the threat Hamas and Islamic Jihad pose to the authority of the new Palestinian prime minister is lessened,

thereby improving the prospects of a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even the House of Saud is taking steps to reform the anti-American curriculum taught in their schools.

President Bush's foreign policy approach is designed to drain the swamp that breeds terror. The early verdict suggests he will be proven right.

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Damned If We Do, Damned If We Don't

Jean Bethke Elshain

The most exigent matter that lies before the international community is this: how do we bring about the political stability—the minimal civic peace—necessary to attain and secure fundamental human goods, including the blessings of liberty, to the world and the future.

Absent political stability, every attempt to prop up tottering regimes must fail. A prime example of the ills attendant upon radical political instability is the disaster of so-called “failed states” in which human beings are prey to the ruthless and irresponsible. States themselves, like the late and unlamented regime of Saddam Hussein, may become violent predators against the civic peace, hence agents of injustice. It is failed states and tyrannical, rogue states that pose the greatest threat to the safety and security of the United States and the world at large. The Bush Doctrine aims at attempting to forestall certain problems before they reach a crisis point, with the secu-

rity of the United States first and foremost. But one cannot leave matters there. This doctrine is also a moral vision that views liberty as a gift to all humankind. There are no people—no single person—who should be deprived of the political liberty and civic equality that flows from our God-given dignity. I have called this a principle of “equal regard.”

There will be times when this principle of equal regard is violated. If the harm being done to persons is egregious and continuing, if you and your people are victims of one of the many horrors attendant upon radical political instability, then you can make a claim to have coercive force deployed in your behalf. That is one implication.

The other is that responsible members of the international community must respond to such claims, rather than standing by as ethnic cleansing proceeds apace, as it did in Bosnia and in Rwanda in the 1990s. The United Nations has proven ineffective (to put it mildly) in this regard. Indeed, it seems quite clear that if the United States doesn't take the lead in an activist foreign policy that responds to the cries of victims in the interest of sparing further harm and building an international community in which constitutional governments guarantee basic human rights and dignity, no one else will.

Being the world's superpower isn't easy. You are damned if you do and damned if you don't. If you fail to act, you are assailed for that failure. If you act, you are accused of imperialism. The Bush Doctrine understands this

and sets the United States on the course of action. This does not mean hyperactive and frenetic intervention everywhere. It means assessing very carefully where the greatest violations are taking place and where precise use of force might have the most beneficial effect. This doctrine steers a middle way between a narrow realpolitik that severs ethical and diplomatic considerations and an unsatisfactory moralism that recoils at the use of American power. The former invites hard-headedness that slides into cynicism; the latter promotes soft-headedness that prides itself on moral purism even if the world is going to hell in a handbasket.

We will never be safe from terror in any perfect sense. But the best protection lies in a world of decent, if not perfect, states—states that can stand up to terrorists who would use weak or venal states as bases for their horrible activities. Too much has been made of the so-called “doctrine of preemption,” as if the Bush strategy will be invading one country after another on the off chance that these countries may, at some distant point, pose a threat to us. This is silly. The doctrine is careful about how to assess threats and clear that the United States cannot go everywhere and do everything.

As to “perpetual war,” you don’t need a recipe for that. That is pretty much what exists by definition, at least in situ, in the world as we know it. Rather, the doctrine, vigorously but modestly applied and in a manner that avoids triumphalism, promises not to usher in an era of “perpetual peace” but

a world with less injustice and fewer deadly threats to human dignity than the one we now inhabit.

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Showing the Best Side of America

Patrick Garry

The international debate preceding the war in Iraq focused on America’s justifications for taking action against Saddam Hussein—justifications that seemed so obvious: a brutal dictator whose invasions of Iran and Kuwait had left a million people dead, who had used chemical weapons against tens of thousands of his own people, was defying U.N. mandates, supporting terrorism, and torturing any Iraqi even suspected of dissent. But the more relevant debate would have been why the United Nations had not acted sooner.

The world still seems stuck in the mentality developed during the late nineteenth century and solidified during the Cold War. It was a status-quo mentality that discouraged action, that looked to the alignment of regimes instead of their character, and that focused only on the behavior of the large superpowers. Even since the end of the Cold War, the international community has had a dismal record in standing up to Third World tyranny and persecution. The United Nations did nothing about the massacres in Rwanda, and has virtually turned its

back on the oppression in Cuba and North Korea.

Rather than moving beyond Cold War politics, the French are trying to reimpose a sort of bipolar conflict in the world. They seek to create an international coalition permanently aligned to check the assertion of American power. But this endeavor is more concerned with a knee-jerk opposition to America than with acting to enhance democracy and human rights around the world.

With a Cold War mentality gripping the international community with inaction, a new strain of isolationism has been doing so at home. During the 1920s and 1930s, the primary advocates of isolationism were conservatives, who believed that foreign entanglement would corrupt America. But more recently, the isolationists in America have been the liberals, who are still mired in the failures of Vietnam. And their isolationism stems from the belief (a belief unshaken by victory in the Cold War) that it is America who will corrupt the rest of the world.

The liberal isolationism is not a rejection of the outside world, but rather a withdrawal from active engagement with its trouble spots, reflected in an eagerness to hide behind the never-ending process of U.N. debate. Consequently, throughout most of the 1990s, the world simmered under American and U.N. inaction—a simmering that boiled over on September 11, 2001.

It was Ronald Reagan's ending of the Cold War that opened the door for America to finally play the democratiz-

ing role that Woodrow Wilson envisioned for it in the aftermath of World War I. And it is George W. Bush who has stepped into that role and who is willing to commit the United States to a foreign policy morally inspired by the words: "The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity."

Liberals may not like the terms "Evil Empire" or "Axis of Evil," but they have no trouble selectively employing the word "evil" at home. Tobacco companies are evil; opponents of social welfare programs are evil; some members of Congress even described Newt Gingrich as evil. Yet if we can say that Enron executives are evil, why can't we say that one of worst tyrants in the world is evil? And if at home we encourage whistle-blowers to break ranks with their company when they feel it is acting wrongly, why shouldn't the United States act unilaterally when the United Nations is wrong and when millions of people are suffering because of that wrong?

Throughout the Cold War, much of the world came to see the United States as a superpower intent on preserving the status quo at all costs. It came to see America as the prop behind brutal Third World dictators, as the leader of a world that didn't care enough to make any real effort to help oppressed peoples. So perhaps the best way for the United States to protect itself from terrorism is to show the oppressed of the world that they can have hope in America, that America will help them even when the United Nations will not, that America believes in freedom

enough to fight for it, and that America still carries the flame of revolution when it comes to democracy.

Patrick Garry is a lawyer and the author of An American Paradox and Nation of Adversaries.

The Academy and the Loathing of America

John E. Haynes

An activist American foreign policy must deal with anti-Americanism having become a major force around the world. It has many sources: envy and resentment at American success and power; rage among a segment of Arabs and Muslims at their own culture's inability to engage modernity, and scapegoating of America as the cause of that failure; demagoguery by foreign political elites seeking to divert popular unrest away from the shortcomings of their regimes; and the substitution of anti-Americanism for Marxism as the core value of the international left.

For most of the twentieth century many millions of people, particularly among intelligentsia, ardently believed in socialism's triumph. Socialism became the carrier of a chiliastic utopianism that in its totalitarian version murdered millions. At Solovki, one of the earliest gulag camps, Soviet administrators put up a sign that expressed the communist program: "With an iron fist, we will lead humanity to happiness." Instead, they led too much of the world into hell. Communism failed not only economically but spiritually as well, and the reality of freedom in the democracies of the West compared

with the oppression of the East mocked the idealistic promises of Marxism-Leninism. The success of market economies along with the Cold War defeat of communism destroyed the ideological infrastructure of revolutionary socialism. But democratic socialism subsided as well. The efficiency of market capitalism so outshone command economies that the democratic socialist parties of the West abandoned collectivism for the mundane task of management of a welfare state dependent upon the productivity of the private sector. The utopian impulse, however, remains, and large segments of the left seek a scapegoat for the collapse of their dreams. America, the preeminent capitalist nation and the leader of the Cold War against communism, is the obvious target for those infuriated by the shattering of their hopes. The left is no longer sure of how it can build utopia but is certain that it cannot be achieved without the destruction of American power.

In addition to preeminent military power and a muscular diplomacy, American foreign policy in this new era requires an aggressive ideological offensive to neutralize anti-Americanism. It needs, also, a campaign to encourage healthy elements in the Arab and the broader Islamic world that are seeking to absorb modernity and isolate those rejecting it. At the end of the Cold War, the United States dismantled much of its public diplomacy/psychological operations apparatus. In new forms that effort must be recreated. This will not be an easy task. It is in many ways easier to design a smart

bomb to destroy a tank from thirty miles away than to design and deliver a persuasive message that will discourage foreign populations from absorbing anti-American demagoguery. There is also the oddity that America, the land that invented modern advertising, tends to regard ideological warfare as vaguely unethical or wimpy compared with straightforwardly killing the enemy. It is much easier to get appropriations for a robust military than for the more modest investment required for the struggle on the cultural front. Nonetheless, a successful exercise of an activist American foreign policy must engage America's enemies in all ideological arenas.

Additionally, progress on the foreign ideological front requires confronting the anti-American left within. The domestic anti-American left, particularly that prevalent in the academic world and the media, validates and encourages foreign anti-Americanism. When foreign journalists, opinion leaders, and intellectuals have their hate America sentiments ratified and cheered on by American academics, they are assured of their righteousness. It is difficult to envision substantial success in combating foreign anti-Americanism when the American academic world tells foreigners that the United States is an imperialist and racist power bent on world domination. To be sure, most academics are not anti-American leftists, but the tone of the academy is set by the hard left's loathing for the existing American constitutional and political order. The democratic left, which once set

the tone of the academy, has withered and lapsed into pacifity. An academic right barely exists. How this problem can be dealt with is not clear, but that it must be confronted is.

John E. Haynes is a historian and co-author (with Harvey Klehr) of the forthcoming book, In Denial: Historians, Communism, and Espionage.

No Return to Isolationism

Frederick M. Hess

The twentieth century illustrated the perils of a weak or indecisive foreign policy. The dangers have taken on a new urgency in a world where the threats come not only from nation-states but from shadowy networks that hide behind recognized governments and flit from one country to another as opportunity dictates.

American hesitancy fosters the belief that the United States will not stand by its allies, will flee in the face of resistance, or will cut deals to save face and avoid unpleasantness. This perception, in turn, increases the potential rewards for challenging American interests, engenders enthusiasm among our enemies, and sows doubt in the minds of our friends.

Once we became a superpower, partly by choice and partly by circumstance, there could be no return to isolationism. America is a symbol of modernity and Western industrial democracy. We are the guarantors of security for our trading partners and fellow democracies. Our prosperity and influence will inspire resentment and anger whether or not we try to turn inwards.

In the years ahead, the United States will face challenges from threats both familiar and unfamiliar. Conventional nation-states such as China may prove to be military or geopolitical threats, while other states—like North Korea and Syria—may pose threats by sheltering terrorists and disseminating weapons of mass destruction or by threatening regional hostilities. At the same time, we find ourselves engaged in an ongoing struggle with the nebulous networks of international terrorism.

The challenges presented by these two kinds of threats are different, but both make the case for an activist and forward-looking foreign policy.

In a world shaped by rival nation-states, projecting force assuages allies and deters potential enemies. Our alliances have always advanced our political and commercial interests by recognizing our status as the senior military partner; an America that appears unwilling to act on behalf of our interests is less able to make demands of its friends. If Japan or Poland is not certain that America will have the strength and the will to stand by them in perilous times, they may face domestic pressure to accept accords or agreements that weaken our strategic position.

Matters become even starker when we contemplate the terrorist threat. Terrorism is shaped by psychology and ideology. Terrorism draws its strength not from a shared sense of physical community, but from beliefs in the rightness and significance of one's cause. Terrorists operate outside of the machinery of the nation-state, making

it impossible to deter them in any conventional sense, but leaving them dependent upon sympathetic regimes.

The nature of terrorism creates three imperatives for an activist foreign policy. First, terrorist organizations draw absolute believers, typically those of religious origin. The most direct way to squelch such opposition is by draining the swamp in which it thrives. This means working to alter educational systems and popular cultures that preach anti-Western and anti-modern doctrines. In Iraq, toppling Saddam's regime creates an opportunity to flush out a system riven by violent anti-Americanism. In Qatar, commercial ties and quiet diplomacy have stifled the appeal of fundamentalist elements. A muscular foreign policy will dramatically strengthen our hand in combating the taproots of extremism.

Second, extremist, stateless movements depend not only on the ability to draw upon a sympathetic population, but also upon the ability to provide followers with a sense of purpose. Vital to their appeal is the sense that there is a grand purpose to the sacrifice; when terrorist groups can point to successful attacks or to infidels who have retreated, it lends an intoxicating air of possibility that can enthrall recruits and stiffen resolve. Puncturing that triumphalism—whether by rolling up Al-Qaida cells or toppling the Iraqi regime—renders the sacrifices and the cause less appealing.

Finally, and most prosaically, terrorist outfits need a base of operations. They need someone to provide them with weapons, a place to conduct train-

ing, and bankers who will turn a blind eye to financial machinations. Despite our worst fears, there is only a limited supply of such redoubts. Moving powerfully and successfully against one shrinks the potential pool and leaves other regimes more hesitant to protect terrorists.

The world is not an easy place. Moving aggressively will inevitably alienate some and may provoke new sources of discontent. These concerns are real and such care as is possible should be taken to minimize these outcomes. In an imperfect world, however, there is no substitute for a strong and activist position in securing America's freedom.

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Resolve will Make America Safer

Shahid Islam

In the wake of a brilliant military success in Iraq, people are engaged in the post-mortem of how President Bush handled the campaign. Particularly, people ask whether it was a good idea to ignore the United Nations and go to war with Iraq with the coalition of the willing. One metric that could be used to answer the question is: will this policy make the United States safer or make it more vulnerable to terrorist attacks?

None of us can answer that question with any degree of certainty since we can't see the future, so we make inferences from the past. In the past

half-century, the United States followed two main strategies. One is détente—maintaining the balance of power, containing the enemy, and hoping they will not strike. Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and Clinton were proponents of this thesis. The other approach is best put in Ronald Reagan's words, "There can be only one end of the war we are in. It won't go away... wars end in victory or defeat." That means good cannot coexist with evil. Evil has to be exterminated by force if necessary.

Détente led to Soviet expansionism around the world. Every twelve years the Soviets invaded a country and put it under communist rule—Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1980. At the same time freedom and liberty suffered. When Reagan stood up to tyranny and professed his vision of peace through strength, he was roundly criticized. Thousands marched in Western Europe when he put missiles in West Germany. But, communism, one of the biggest evils the human race has ever known, collapsed. Europe, both East and West, are free from the oppression called communism.

The lesson from this little excursion in history is simple. Tyrants do not understand logic or reason. The only thing they understand is power. When the United States was perceived as weak, attacks were made on its interests, U.S. citizens were taken hostage, embassies were bombed, warships were attacked. Osama bin Laden plainly declared that the United States was a paper tiger. The United States will

back off if you hit hard, he said. He cited Lebanon in 1982 and Somalia in 1993 as proof. The muted response in the wake of 1998 embassy bombings and the attacks on the coast of Yemen in 2000 only encouraged him. This encouragement resulted in the September 11 attacks.

When decisive force was used, the infrastructures of terror were demolished. They will think ten times before making another such evil decision. After the victory in Iraq, the stubbornness of North Korea seems to be melting. They have agreed to multilateral talks, which they were opposing even a week earlier.

For the Iraqi people, the major outcome of the conflict will be liberation. Could liberation have been achieved through the United Nations? Tyrannical rulers control the majority of the U.N. member countries. They have no interest in seeing one of their soul mates being deposed. Could we have achieved liberation of the Iraqi people by assassinating Saddam Hussein? Removing one leader is insufficient to free the people from the cruel clutch of an oppressive regime. The Baath Party is not a political party in the ordinary sense. A political party's goal is to compete and win the political debate by persuading the population. The Baath Party, like the Nazi or Fascist or Communist parties, exists to indoctrinate and subjugate the population to its will by any means necessary, including brutal oppression. The only way the people of Iraq can be free is by ridding the country of the Baath Party—the way that the Allies rid Germany of the Nazis.

History suggests that oppressed people usually need external help to free themselves. It was true for the children of Israel under the pharaohs. It is true today for the people of Iraq.

People argue about the cost of liberation in terms of the innocent victims. It is an unfortunate fact of life that nothing worth creating can be created without pain. Not human life and not human liberation.

If history is any predictor, the “foreign policy of resolve”—as President Reagan put it—will make America safer.

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After Containment

Scott W. Johnson

When the Cold War came to an end in 1989, it represented the successful conclusion to a foreign policy pursued by the United States over a period of forty years. President George H.W. Bush declined to take any act that could be construed as gloating; he neither declared victory nor recognized the statesmanship that had brought us victory. As a result, Americans are vastly uninformed about the fact that our victory was the result of a policy adopted and pursued by many who deserve our tribute and our gratitude.

Foremost among the architects of victory, we must count not only President Truman, who stood down the Soviet Union in Greece and Turkey in the immediate aftermath of World War

II, but also Dean Acheson, Truman's secretary of state, and the relatively unknown national security advisers who formulated the policy of containment set forth in April 1950 in the (then top-secret) memorandum known as NSC-68. Pursued more (Reagan) or less (Carter) faithfully by succeeding administrations over the ensuing forty years, the policy culminated in the liberation of Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Since 1993, the United States has been the target of both foiled plots and consummated attacks by terrorist groups and their state sponsors. To take just one spectacular example, Laurie Mylroie's 2000 book, *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America*, assembled the evidence supporting the view that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had been masterminded by operatives of Saddam Hussein's regime. According to Mylroie, President Clinton willfully averted his eyes from the evidence; he never even met with his director of Central Intelligence regarding the attack. Rather, he treated the attack simply as a domestic crime whose perpetrators were to be brought to justice.

On September 11, 2001, we entered a new era, an era in which the United States could no longer afford the luxury of ignoring the war being waged against it. Unlike the Cold War, this war is a shooting war, it is a war conducted in part on American soil, and it is a war against enemies who cannot be

contained.

Given the inapplicability of a policy of containment to our current enemies, this war calls for a new policy much as the circumstances that confronted President Truman in 1947 called for one. Such a policy must recognize some truths that were unlearned during the Clinton era: that terrorist groups are not "loose networks" that subsist on their own devices, but rather that they prosper with the connivance of state sponsors; that we must wage war against them rather than bring them to justice; and that these state sponsors must be held accountable for the acts of the terrorist groups they harbor.

Such a policy must also reflect facts brought home to us since 9/11: that the possible distribution of weapons of mass destruction by state sponsors to terrorist groups presents a clear and present danger to the existence of the United States, and that under the circumstances we choose not to wait until we are attacked again before taking decisive action against the terrorist groups and state sponsors that seek to destroy us.

The adoption by the Bush administration of the National Security Strategy of the United States in September 2002 represents a turning point in our foreign policy, as did the adoption of NSC-68 in April 1950. The key passage of the strategy is this one:

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a

reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

The policy of preemption stated in the strategy is neither novel nor unreasonable. On the contrary, it formulates the only prudent policy appropriate to the extraordinarily challenging circumstances that we face. Americans must pray that succeeding administrations will adhere to it at least as faithfully as those who followed President Truman adhered to the policy of containment, until the threat that it addresses has been eliminated and the foes that seek to destroy us have been vanquished.

Scott W. Johnson is a Minneapolis attorney and a member of American Experiment's board of directors.

Why America Woke

Mark Kennedy

After 9/11, I considered following the lead of another Kennedy, JFK, who wrote *Why England Slept* during World War II, and writing *Why America Slept*. My book would tell the cautionary tale of what happened when America fell asleep to the siren song of peace through submission to an amorphous international will. America has been reawakened to the threat that was always there.

I see the Bush Doctrine as the logical successor to the Reagan doctrine of peace through strength. I am continu-

ally amazed by those who still question the efficacy of peace through strength, despite its decades-long run of success dating back to World War II. Appeasement led to millions of deaths; Ronald Reagan won the Cold War and liberated millions without firing a shot.

The fundamental fault-line in the foreign policy debate, I believe, is between those who see a strong and engaged America as a force for peace, and those who see America as the problem rather than the solution—those Jeane Kirkpatrick so famously labeled the “blame America first” crowd.

Given their opposition to military action in Iraq and to the Bush foreign policy generally, the worldwide left, led by French Gaullists like Jacques Chirac and American liberals like Howard Dean, must at some point attempt to lay out something like a coherent worldview. That should be a most interesting doctrine, since Governor Dean couldn't declare unequivocally that the Iraqi people will be better off without Saddam Hussein.

In an age where terror, chemical weapons, and stealth organizations lacking national homes define the international landscape, containment and realpolitik seem archaic concepts. Coexistence is possible, though not desirable, with anti-democratic, even dictatorial states. But, madmen and terrorists can't be contained. They must be defeated.

Further, it should hardly shock anyone that the Bush administration advocates the proposition that all citizens are better off living with basic personal and political freedoms in

free-market economies. That this troubles certain autocratic regimes gives pause to the worldwide diplomatic bureaucracy and the *New York Times*, but to most of us, it's common sense.

President Bush, like the Founders, takes the view that basic liberty is not a gift of government, but a gift from God. When I hear the skeptics of freedom and free markets in places like Iraq, I think back to Jefferson's letter on the meaning of the Declaration of Independence on its fiftieth anniversary, "the palpable truth is that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately by the grace of God."

The other major issue stemming from the fissure over liberating Iraq is the future of the United Nations and international institutions generally. That's a big question given the United Nation's lack of fortitude over Iraq, its failures in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia, and so on. I'm personally uncomfortable with Libya chairing the human rights commission that includes Cuba, and with Iraq chairing a commission on disarmament.

I believe it is long past time for a fundamental rethinking of existing international organizations, a regular occurrence during the past century. After all, those institutions present after World War I were long gone or completely transformed after World War II. Under current circumstances, it may be time to relegate the United Nations to a role similar to that of the

British monarchy, useful for ceremonial purposes but leaving serious matters to serious people.

It would be useful to the causes of peace and freedom for those nations who are committed to individual freedom, free markets, and a willingness to take action—including force—to preserve the peace to exert a more cohesive influence on international events. That was the original structure of the U.N. Security Council as designed by the victors in World War II, like-minded nations banding together for common purposes.

We should stop pretending that the views of brutal dictatorships are equal to those of elected democracies. We must deal honestly with international differences if we hope to avoid the United Nations' mistakes. If the twenty-first century is to be more peaceful and less bloody than the twentieth century, it will be based on the Ronald Reagan-George W. Bush doctrine of peace through strength.

Mark Kennedy, a Republican, represents Minnesota's Sixth District in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Cultivating Freedom and Prosperity

Mary Kiffmeyer

When I first became a homeowner many years ago, I planted a garden. Lots of plants came up, and I was happy. But some of the plants were, in fact, weeds. The weeds kind of got away from me, and when I finally pulled them, the vegetables came out,

too. My mother offered no sympathy. I'd waited too long, and I learned my lesson.

Foreign policy can be a little like gardening: nurturing goes a long way, but you also must vigilantly look out for weeds and get 'em while they're little—before their removal damages everything around them.

I think we all want to live in a peaceful and prosperous world—in a garden without weeds. After all, wouldn't that be most comfortable? Yet the fact of foreign policy is that just as weeds will grow in gardens, bullies will appear on the world stage.

Bullies are not reasonable. They're warped in their thinking and in their actions. They don't negotiate—at least not in good faith. Indeed, history has shown time and again that the world's tyrants use the diplomatic process as a veil to hide their evil deeds. As the world trustingly and sometimes naïvely tries to engage them in diplomacy, they seize the opportunity to build up their armies, eliminate domestic rivals, and manipulate the mass media. Eventually, they lash out: in the past century, we have seen dictators consolidate power and, in turn, export anti-Semitism, Communism, and terrorism.

It is difficult for good people to conceive of this kind of evil and deception. Yet we must deal with reality. We must deal with people the way they are, not as we wish they could be.

As good people we must be committed to steering the world toward our ideals—toward what we know is right. With most nations, this can be done

through civilized diplomatic channels, vigorous economic and cultural exchanges, and free-flowing mass communication. Yet in some cases, a more astute stance must be taken. To his credit, President Bush has recognized that once we've identified the world's bullies, we must deal with them as they are, on their own terms.

America has long espoused a vision of worldwide freedom and prosperity. Yet without action, that vision has no meaning. Without vigilance, that vision has no chance. Since becoming a significant force in world affairs a century ago, America has identified threats to this vision and addressed them directly and decisively.

"We gird up our loins as a nation with the stern purpose to play our part manfully in winning the ultimate triumph; and therefore we turn scornfully aside from the paths of mere ease and idleness, and with unfaltering steps tread the rough road of endeavor, smiting down the wrong and battling for the right," Theodore Roosevelt said at the 1901 Minnesota State Fair.

There's no question about it, as American ideals are spread throughout the world, real people's lives improve. The world is freer and more prosperous because of the past century of American involvement. President Bush's activist foreign policy continues an American tradition that has proven to be highly successful—sometimes through diplomacy, sometimes through force.

Just as experience has taught me to pull the weeds so my flowers and produce can grow, history has taught us to

remove the tyrants so freedom and prosperity can flourish.

Mary Kiffmeyer, a Republican, is Minnesota's twentieth secretary of state.

Results Matter

John Kline

The attacks of September 11 presented America with a bold challenge: act or be acted upon. It was a result, some say, of proceeding with Cold War strategies long after the Cold War had come to an end. Every election, every regime change—no matter how small or large—shifts the balance of international power and changes the global landscape. And each new era requires a shift—maybe small, maybe large—in policy that reflects these changes.

Any foreign policy must involve a component of action; faith without deeds is dead. The question before any administration is not whether to act, but how to act. In this post-Cold War era, the Bush administration had to answer the question: what course of action best addresses the newest set of challenges?

“Results matter,” William Kristol, editor of the *Weekly Standard*, explained in a piece touting President Reagan’s success in addressing the challenge of the Cold War. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan’s peace-through-strength foreign policy was vindicated. Critics were silenced as they witnessed the international landscape altered forever.

In September 2002, President Bush issued a national security strategy, outlining his intended course of action

to address the threat of terrorism. At that time, the president spoke of preparation, deliberation, and action. Paying heed to the new global dynamic he said, “In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.” This strategy and the events that ensued have been referred to as the Bush Doctrine. The situation, fresh in our minds, provides an example of this doctrine in practice.

If faith without deeds is dead, deeds without faith are deadly. In good faith, President Bush and his administration engaged in the diligent preparation of research and intelligence-gathering—the result of which revealed the magnitude and immediacy of the threat posed by Iraq. In good faith, the administration engaged in months of deliberation with the United Nations. Despite the debate surrounding the final weeks of discussion, these deliberations yielded a unanimous call for cooperation by Iraq. It was the refusal of Iraq to cooperate that determined the type of action necessary.

Action in Iraq took the form of military engagement because it was the response required by the situation. The result of the action was the elimination of Saddam’s regime. Saddam’s elimination is a prime example of a result that matters. His disappearance is a significant achievement in the quest to make the world safer from terror.

It is simplistic for critics to assume military action will be the automatic response to future conflicts. Rather than the perpetual war feared by critics, the president has selected diplomacy as his course of action on a number

of fronts. Immediately following the liberation of Baghdad by U.S. forces, Secretary of State Colin Powell embarked on a rigorous schedule of diplomacy, winning praise for his negotiations with Syria regarding its support of terrorism, with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program, and for promoting talks between Israel and a newly emerging Palestinian leadership regarding the creation of a Palestinian state.

The freedom to choose diplomacy is another result of the policy of action—an option that might not have been available before the international community believed we were willing to back our words with decisive military force. It is President Bush's policy of action that now provides us with the option of meaningful discussion.

Results do matter. The result of the Bush Doctrine is a world made more secure from the threat of terror and a world in which diplomacy is again an option for success. And it is on these results President Bush and his administration will be judged.

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Exposing Radicalism's Darkest Corners

William A. LeMire

The wisdom and effectiveness of a "muscular" and "activist" U.S. foreign policy are being played out right before our eyes. As I compose this, jubilant

Iraqi citizens are dancing and cheering in the streets of Baghdad. One Iraqi was quoted as saying: "I am 49 years old and I have never lived. Today I start living." The Iraqi people are celebrating their freedom in scenes eerily and joyfully reminiscent of Berlin in 1989 and, for that matter, Times Square in 1945. Iraqis and Arabs in general, are no different from other human beings. They, too, prefer to live in freedom and dignity.

Freedom and human dignity as a core element of U.S. foreign policy is a concept originally given birth by Ronald Reagan and other like-minded conservatives. The policy recognizes that human freedom is the essential key to a reasonably safe and peaceful world. Oppression and tyranny, in contrast, breed radicalism and hatred, and, ultimately, the forms of terrorism and violence so painfully experienced in our country's history. Today, modern technology enables the most radical states to mount immediate threats to American peace and prosperity.

The question becomes: how does U.S. foreign policy effectively address these threats to American peace and prosperity? We will never defeat or contain fanatical terrorism unless we are willing to forcefully confront states that harbor, assist, or encourage such terrorism. Such states typically are oppressive regimes where citizens have never tasted freedom. These states are fertile ground for breeding radical hatred of Western values. A "muscular" and "activist" U.S. foreign policy strives to eradicate radicalism by, in

part, exposing its darkest corners to the sunshine of human freedom. Human freedom and dignity are especially harsh climates for radicalism.

Having tasted true freedom, human nature has no appetite for oppression and its malevolent by-products. An activist foreign policy is essential to rooting out the breeding grounds of terrorism and preemptively thwarting their harvests. American foreign policy cannot afford a wait-and-see approach to such imminent threats. This will occasionally require that we use military force to secure freedom. Military force is altogether necessary to preserve the credibility of our foreign policy and, more importantly, to secure a more stable and peaceful world by unleashing freedom and the recognition of human dignity. The U.N. Security Council has demonstrated its unwillingness or inability to meaningfully confront tyranny. The United States therefore must lead the confrontation against tyranny and build the credibility necessary for successful execution of a preemptive foreign policy.

The primary threat to global peace and stability comes from radicalized and oppressed states that also possess weapons of mass destruction. Iraq is one, but there are others. Whatever hope there is that they can be persuaded to disarm, or withdraw support or sanctuary from terrorists, rests on the certainty and effectiveness with which they are aggressively confronted. Evidently, the U.N. Security Council is not up to the task. History once again calls upon the United States of America and its reliable allies like Great

Britain to execute a foreign policy that confronts evil, secures human freedom, and willingly commits the last full measure of devotion to achieve global peace and prosperity. Muscular? Yes. Activist? Yes. Absolutely imperative for order in our twenty-first century? Yes.

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The War on the War on Terrorism

Heather Mac Donald

I very much hope that our venture in Iraq proves to be a success: that it thwarts radical movements there, brings democracy, and sets an example for the Middle East.

But I worry that the Iraqi invasion may not accomplish these ends. And even if it does, there remain real dangers associated with preemptive wars.

First is the power of precedent. Preemption is a fine doctrine, as long as we're the only ones practicing it.

Second is the effect on world opinion. The images of jubilant Iraqis celebrating Saddam's downfall have not changed the view in the Arab world that America is an invading, imperialist force. Rather, the images of young boys with their arms blown off by American bombs will likely increase the draw of anti-American Islamist terror groups. Indeed, radical Islamists are already recruiting on the basis of the Iraq war.

Some argue that strength is the best deterrent to terrorism. But while the prospect of aggressive military action

may deter nation-states from attacking us, it's hard to understand how certain destruction deters a suicide bomber.

The third danger is the sheer cost of rebuilding societies that we have attacked preemptively—whose number could be enormous depending on which of the many rationales for the Iraq invasion presented by the Bush administration predominates. If the rationale is liberating people oppressed by dictators, we could be running many of the world's countries in a few years.

I'm all for a muscular foreign policy, guided by self-interest. While I'm delighted that Iraqis may eventually enjoy the benefits of freedom, their freedom is secondary to our security. And that security may be put at increased risk as the need to police Iraq for the foreseeable future draws intelligence resources away from other terror-breeding hotspots.

The Bush administration argues that by planting a Western-style democracy in Iraq, the country will be less dangerous to us. Maybe. Such a democracy could also exacerbate demotic extremism, rather than fostering Western values. Algeria's first election in 1991 did not bring in a liberal, Western-friendly regime, and it was its last for many years.

In forging and acting upon the preemption doctrine, many conservatives have abandoned the great insight of conservative thought: the difficulty of engineering improvements in human society without producing unintended consequences. The unforeseen consequences of the Iraq invasion may haunt us for years to come.

But however concerned I am by the effects of our current foreign policy, I worry almost as much about a purely domestic issue: the power of the nation's elites to block or water down needed improvements in domestic defenses against terrorism. There is not a single modest measure that the Bush administration has taken to improve our intelligence capacity and to protect our borders that has not been greeted by the media, advocacy groups, and academia with howls of "totalitarianism!" and "fascism!" As long as the opinion elites continue their hysterical war on the war on terrorism, the country will not be safe.

Heather Mac Donald is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute in New York, and author of Are Cops Racist? How the War Against the Police Harms Black Americans.

A Foreign Policy for a Powerful, Benevolent Nation

J. Stanley Marshall

A "morally informed American foreign policy," to borrow Bill Kristol's perceptive phrase, is a noble and entirely attainable goal, one that Americans would do well to embrace. Such a foreign policy would recognize and celebrate the vision of a powerful but benevolent America, precisely the America that led the war against Iraq.

This view is one that is, I believe, held by many Americans, though by no means all.

Can the United States' "unilateral action" against Iraq be defended by those who value our relations with

France, Germany, and Russia, all of which opposed the Bush administration's decision to go it alone? I believe it can, and the best defense is a straightforward assertion that our foreign policy should always and forever be guided by the United States' national interests.

And that calls into question the role of the United Nations, a matter hotly debated as the war approached. In the morally informed foreign policy I endorse, the United Nation's role generally would be to carry out various relief and civil administration tasks, and probably occasional, brief military actions, but to play a very limited role in policymaking.

Why this more-limited role than that envisioned by so-called multilateralists? Because nations have their own interests, which always will be and should be their first consideration. There are good reasons a "one-world government" is a fatuous, never-to-be-taken seriously notion. People engage in nation-building with others who have similar interests (which usually include such things as politics, geography, religion, economics, ethnic and racial ties, and a history of oppression). Why should those who have labored to bring a nation into existence be expected to subjugate its interests to those of a so-called "international community?" (Another fatuous idea unless the "community" stays clear of making policy.)

The United States was following a morally informed policy when we waged war on Iraq. The people of Iraq, who were for decades denied the most

basic freedoms and were subject to oppression and abuse on a scale unimaginable to most people, would likely regard our policy as morally defensible. Their response since the war to the removal of their oppressor and the restoration of their freedoms would indicate as much.

But there are those who believe that moral (and humane) considerations make waging war untenable, not just in Iraq but as universal national policy. They believe war is so terrible that initiating war as a preventive measure can never be condoned. In other words, we should seek to abolish war as an instrument of national policy or for any other purpose. Would that it were so. The truth—the awful truth, some might say—is that man has known war since earliest times and for reasons good or ill, that will not change.

Efforts to prevent wars should, of course, be supported and each war should be prevented by every reasonable means. But national policy should be founded in reality, not on an elevated notion of humanity, nor on moral or religious dogma that impedes rational discourse—and which may, in the end, result in more destruction and death, more denial of freedom and human rights than waging war. Would those opposed to war in general have opposed the American Revolution or the American Civil War; and would they deny that preventive military action against Hitler in 1939 might have prevented the horrors of World War II?

I believe the Bush administration's muscular, activist policy in Iraq—and perhaps to be applied elsewhere—is

justified. America is the world's superior power in terms military and economic and clearly a powerful moral force as well. Walt Whitman said it well more than a century ago: "America strives to be great and powerful as a nation so that it can bring about the full flowering of individuals." Americans would do well to acknowledge our power and accept the dominant world role that power imposes on us. And we should encourage other people to do the same and to rejoice that such awesome power resides in a nation that was born in liberty, has defended individual freedoms throughout the world and, at this critical juncture, is the best hope for peace and freedom for peoples in every land.

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Preemption Pitfalls

Will Marshall

America's stunningly swift liberation of Iraq was a political triumph for President Bush. It did not, however, fully redeem the administration's diplomatic failures leading up to the war, nor did it vindicate the Bush Doctrine of preemption. That doctrine asserts a unilateral American right to attack countries we think may threaten us, especially with the unholy trinity of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. It's big, bold, and dangerously wrong.

It's true, as the president has said, that America after 9/11 needs new strategies for dealing with a new web of

interlacing threats: terrorism, ethnic, and communal violence, and the spread of terror weapons to outlaw regimes. Almost no one challenges America's right to attack Al-Qaida and other terrorist networks before they strike us. Attacking sovereign nations, however, is a more complicated matter.

According to the Bush Doctrine, preemption is necessary because the United States can no longer rely on deterrence—the threat of a massive retaliatory strike—to defend itself. What worked against the "risk-averse" Soviet Union, it says, won't work against "leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations."

But is this sweeping claim true? For the Taliban, maybe, but they could hardly be said to be a government in the modern sense. The charter members of the "Axis of Evil"—Iraq, North Korea, and Iran—have shown no inclination to commit regime suicide by directly attacking America. Unlike terror groups, rogue states have return addresses and can't entirely evade the logic of deterrence.

Might they be more aggressive if they acquired nuclear weapons? Saddam has said his one regret in attacking Kuwait is that he didn't wait until he had The Bomb, which presumably would have deterred the United States from responding. The fear that really seems to underlie the Bush Doctrine, though, is that hostile regimes will secretly supply terrorists with terrible weapons they can use on us. That danger is certainly plausible, but so far it

hasn't happened. The United States needs more than purely speculative dangers to justify knocking off governments it doesn't like.

This doesn't mean that preemptive strikes are always, like Pearl Harbor, dastardly and infamous. In 1967, Israel wisely decided not to wait for its Arab neighbors to strike the first blow as they mobilized for an attack. In fact, it's a settled principle of international law that nations can strike first in self-defense when they are in imminent danger of being attacked.

But what if we aren't sure? The Bush Doctrine would substitute a new standard—the gravity of the potential threat to the United States—for actual evidence that an attack is imminent. “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack,” it says.

Since America has always had, and frequently exercised, the option of striking preemptively (even when the “threat” seemed pretty remote; think Grenada and Panama), it's not clear what purpose is served by declaring it the new organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy.

Yet such a shift carries three clear dangers.

First, it would be profoundly destabilizing since other countries will surely follow America's lead. Since the fall of Baghdad, for example, Indian leaders have invoked the Bush Doctrine in threatening to attack Pakistan for

allegedly supporting Islamic extremists responsible for violence in Kashmir. It's naïve to think other countries will cede to America an exclusive right to preempt.

Second, the threat of preemption seems more likely to rattle its presumed targets than to make them more tractable. North Korea's isolated and paranoid regime, for example, has cited Bush's “Axis of Evil” rhetoric in threatening to restart its plutonium reprocessing facility and start making nuclear bombs.

Third, the White House strategy has provoked a furious, anti-American backlash around the world. It's not surprising, since some administration hawks appear downright eager to trade the constraints of U.S. global leadership—all those tiresome alliances, world bodies, and treaties that we, more than any nation, willed into creation—for the freedom of action the United States would supposedly gain by going it alone.

More likely, such “freedom” would further isolate our country and abet Paris and others in conjuring up an anti-American alliance determined to restore a global balance of power. In short, there are real costs to U.S. unilateralism. It alienates friends and allies and puts potential adversaries on alert, making it harder for the United States to advance its foreign policy goals. And make no mistake; the Bush Doctrine is Exhibit A for those who assign malign motives to America.

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He's No Reagan

Scott McConnell

The principal cheerleaders of George W. Bush's foreign policy claim the Bush Doctrine as a vindication of Reaganism over the "cramped" realist doctrines of Ford, Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and the first Bush administration. Like Reaganism, they say, the new Bush's Doctrine is the engine for an assertive and "moral" foreign policy, one based on upending dictatorships and spreading democracy.

But the differences between President Bush's policies and Ronald Reagan's are substantial, and not in Bush's favor. Reagan, it will be recalled, managed an effective anti-Soviet alliance that helped bring the Soviet Union down without a major war—a monumental achievement. His policies included diplomacy, a readiness to deploy weapons systems in the face of strident left-wing opposition (the Euromissiles), and ideological clarion calls that challenged communist authority ("tear down this wall").

These tools were combined with real restraint in the actual use of military force. Reagan appealed to the peoples of Eastern Europe over the heads of their rulers and managed decent enough relations with both Beijing's Communist Party and the Chinese citizens it ruled. While his Cold War policies divided Europe, the anti-American left could never muster a majority in France, Italy, Germany, or England. Reagan successfully isolated Moscow's Communist rulers not only from the West but eventually from their own people.

Contrast that with George W. Bush. He has managed to make American foreign policy antagonistic to so much of the world that more governments and peoples than not were actually rooting for the success of Saddam's thuggish regime against the invading forces of the "coalition." Now it is not Moscow, but Washington that has become isolated.

A catch phrase of Bush's "muscular" foreign policy, borrowed from the Israelis and repeated at the briefings of Washington's right-wing think tanks, is "it doesn't matter if they hate us as long as they fear us." And today America is feared. We spend more on our military than the next fourteen countries combined, and regimes throughout the world know it.

But since the war against terror is by nature multilateral, overthrowing Saddam against the world's will has not made the American people any safer. It will henceforth be more difficult to acquire first-rate cooperation from foreign intelligence services, the sort driven by respect and perceived self-interest as much as fear. As for Iraq's much-touted weapons of mass destruction it is not clear at this writing whether they existed (or whether Bush started the war on the basis, simply put, of a lie) or, as some officials now worry, have been dispersed to other countries and groups. Their proliferation outside of Iraq would signal that Bush's "Operation Iraqi Freedom" has only intensified the danger of cataclysmic terror.

Of course Bush's claim to use war to spread democracy and freedom is

absurd. One always wondered whether the pro-war publicists believed it themselves. As I write, massive demonstrations of Shiite Muslims are taking place in Baghdad and Basra; and various Shiite luminaries, before throngs chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” vow to set up an Islamic Republic and impose Sharia. Iraq’s Christians, the day after Easter, are reportedly more fearful than they have been in a generation.

The terror attacks of 9/11 left a stunned American public willing to write President Bush a blank check to do what was needed to win the war on terror. Under neoconservative prodding and guidance, Bush took that mandate and steered a course that has alienated the United States from its natural allies, overthrown a regime that had nothing to do with 9/11, overseen the looting and destruction of archeological treasures and a cultural legacy dating back fifty centuries, and made hatred of America more resonant than it has ever been—both in the Muslim world and in Europe.

In a world in which nuclear weapons can be packed into a suitcase and transported on a fishing trawler, Americans will need something besides raw military power to make them safe. They will need some genuine friends. For this reason, George W. Bush’s “muscular” foreign policy may make him the worst president in our history.

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America vs. the World

Lynda McDonnell

On the long bus ride from Minnesota to Washington for the preemptive peace rally in January, the ghosts of Vietnam rode with us. Someone played tapes of the anthems of that time. Young and middle-aged alike, we sang along: “All we are saying is give peace a chance.” My bus captain wore a vintage peace-symbol pendant. An old friend noted that she last marched on Washington in 1970, when Richard Nixon was president and we were young enough to trust no one over thirty.

It was easy to succumb to nostalgia for that fevered time, when we were young and truly believed that we could eradicate poverty and study war no more. There were young people on my bus, in rainbow-dyed dreadlocks, carrying doves on poles, reverently treating those of us with gray hair and bifocals as veterans of a time when protests were mighty enough to end a war and depose a president. Even the sign some young Republicans hung from a building along the march route—“Hippies Go Home”—made me wistful.

But let’s face it: the three decades since then haven’t produced a utopia of peace and equitable prosperity. Instead, they’ve brought an America of unparalleled economic and military power but alarming vulnerability to small bands of people full of hate. Today’s divisions aren’t generational; instead, it’s America versus the world.

Three months after that march, the war in Iraq has come and gone. America the mighty toppled Saddam Hussein in less than a month. So now where does the Bush Doctrine of preemption lead us now?

For the present, it looks as though might has proven right. North Korea has sat down to talk, Syria is picking up stragglers from Saddam's regime, Yasser Arafat has grudgingly acceded to a new Palestinian cabinet.

But it's not so simple: Shiite clerics in Iraq want us gone, preferring theocracy to democracy. The Taliban is making noises in a largely unreconstructed Afghanistan. At the negotiating table, North Korea threatens a "physical demonstration" of its nuclear capacity. And the Israelis give little sign of serious interest in our road map to peace with the Palestinians.

Clearly, the world is too big and resentments too large for America to rely on unilateral force alone. The cost to U.S. citizens in tax dollars, risk to soldiers, and general ill will is too high. America needs both a stronger moral base for its foreign policy—one that attends to genocide as seriously as threats to oil supply—and an armory that includes cultural, medical, and diplomatic tools as well as military.

According to the scholars at Georgetown University, during John Kennedy's presidency, the United States spent 1 percent of its gross domestic product on nonmilitary means of advancing its influence overseas—the State Department, foreign aid, the United Nations, information programs, and the like. Under President Bush,

that number has dropped to 0.2 percent. In 2003, the face of America overseas is too often young men in body armor and humvees instead of health workers, diplomats, and teachers.

Unfortunately, Democrats in Congress have not articulated a compelling alternative to the aggressively preemptive foreign policy pushed by Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld.

Bill Clinton provided no leadership. He was so multilateralist and poll-driven as to be immobilized in the face of clear cases of genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, and so preoccupied with domestic issues that he failed to frame a new role for America in the post-Cold War world. As Frank McCloskey, the Indiana Democrat who lost his House seat through his obstinate protests over Serbian genocide, said: "The problem with Bill Clinton was that he didn't realize he was president of the United States." However much I disagree with the current administration's stress on military solutions, Bush has been unafraid to act and to lead.

A Problem from Hell, Samantha Power's examination of America's persistent failure to thwart genocide overseas, proposes that protection of basic human rights should become a fundamental element of our foreign policy. National security and strategic interests are simply too narrow a frame. And failure to intercede undercuts our claim to moral authority. First, protect people from harm. Then feed them, clothe them, and bind their wounds. Then talk to them about democracy and free markets.

This doesn't mean becoming the world's policemen. The United States has a range of options—from jamming hate radio to freezing perpetrators' assets and expelling their diplomats—short of military intervention.

In her footnotes, Power quotes James C. Thomson Jr., who resigned from the National Security Council in 1966 to protest the Johnson administration's policy in Vietnam. A year later, he wrote to the *New York Times* with advice that today's policymakers would be wise to follow:

[T]he greatest power on earth has the power denied to others: the power to take unilateral steps, and to keep taking them; the power to be as ingenious and relentless in the pursuit of peace as we are in the infliction of pain; the power to lose face; the power to admit error; and the power to act with magnanimity.

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Let's be Clear **Grover Norquist**

The first step in critiquing America's foreign policy or suggesting improvements is to be clear about what we are trying to accomplish. We start with two slogans that undermine our chances of success by confusing us and the world about our aims.

First, there's "exporting democracy," a Wilsonian echo of World War I, the war that helped bring us Nazism and

Bolshevism. America's status as the world's preeminent economic, political, cultural, and military power flows from our underlying commitment to individual liberty, property rights, the rule of law, and freedom of contract. These are protected by our constitution against "democracy." Our periodic elections are to select leaders who, within the constraints of the constitution, will be least destructive of liberty. Elections do not make us free. They protect the freedoms we already have.

When America tells Third World countries that they will be rich and happy if they have elections, it lies. Zimbabwe has elections. Almost every nation in Africa and Latin America has held elections. Few of them have property rights or the rule of law. When citizens of the Third World see that elections have not led to happiness and prosperity, they presume our wealth comes from robbing them. When America restructured Germany and Japan after World War II, we established property rights and the rule of law first. Elections came later. South Korea, Hong Kong, Chile, Taiwan, and Singapore all testify to the success of this path. Almost the entire rest of the Third World testifies to the failure of "exporting democracy."

Second, this "war on terrorism," sounds like the war on drugs. Terrorism is a tactic. Drugs are inanimate objects. One doesn't fight wars against either. What the American government means by the artless phrase is that we confront the reality that America is vulnerable in a way we had not

thought possible before September 11. We are fighting a war against terrorists who would attack America with weapons of mass destruction just as we used to fight wars against nations that might have launched conventional army and naval attacks on America. This means building a national missile defense and rebuilding a CIA capable of penetrating bad-guy organizations and governments that mean us harm. With Afghanistan and Iraq we have explained to the world that we will not tolerate states supporting third-party attacks on America.

What should we do to protect America and encourage other nations to establish free societies that offer their citizens opportunities to get fat and happy—as opposed to stewing in hopeless poverty that breeds envy and hatred of our wealth and power?

First, we should play to our comparative advantages. We should continue to lead the world in technological progress and innovation that gives us wealth and military dominance. That means taking on the trial lawyers and abolishing the capital gains and death taxes and the double taxation of dividend income. Our own bad laws do more damage to America's economy every year than all the terrorist attacks on the United States in the past century.

Second, we should recognize that our ability to attract and assimilate immigrants is our great competitive advantage. Europe is aging and shrinking. Japan cannot attract immigrants. No one wants to live in China or Saudi Arabia. We can have as many Ameri-

cans as we want. Immigrants are also our blood ties to every nation on earth.

Third, free trade disciplines American business, labor, and government to keep costs down and it creates real economic growth in America and the world. When we remain true to our promise of open markets and open borders, we create opportunities for young people in Pakistan and Egypt to create better lives. When we shut our borders to trade, we breed resentment and we create the poverty that empowers demagogues. The protectionists in the American textile and steel industries have done more damage to America's foreign policy than France has.

Fourth, we should educate the world. One reason to hope for a freer China is the tens of thousands of Chinese students who have studied in America. The progressive forces in the Arab and Muslim nations, Africa and Latin America come from those who studied and lived in America. These men and women know that freedom works. We need more, not fewer, foreign students in America.

Fifth, we should remain confident and optimistic. We are winning.

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Needlessly Seeking 'Monsters to Destroy'

Todd Ojala

The Bush administration's foreign policy may prove to be neither wise nor effective. It is certainly not conservative in any traditional sense of the

word. The goals are revolutionary: to spread “political and economic freedom” around the world, as one of the means of preventing terrorist attacks. Another of the president’s prescriptions for increasing security, demonstrated in Iraq, is the preventive war. These radical policies deserve a healthy dose of skepticism.

One of the almost-certain consequences will be an increase in the global arms trade, as targeted governments attempt to deter the United States. Even if we are able to topple additional regimes in the Axis of Evil, we may find that this does not bring increased peace and stability. The role of our government should be the protection of security and freedom here at home, not regime change abroad. The evidence shows that containment works.

The preventive war doctrine is attractive at first glance. Why not take the bad guys out before they attack? The quick success of the Iraq war, however, is likely to be an anomaly, as nations that feel threatened by U.S. power form alliances and modernize their militaries. An article from the *Moscow Times* during the week after the fall of Baghdad quoted a Russian arms exporter who was ecstatic about the new contracts for weapons that the Russian arms industry is expecting. At least two of our most sophisticated tanks were destroyed by Russian anti-tank missiles, which are probably selling like hotcakes.

An arms race coupled with new regional alliances and cooperation between worried leaders of “rogue

nations” is inevitable. Russia and China will try to capitalize on the instability to gain trade and military exports. Technical superiority is likely to be only a temporary advantage for the United States. If the Chinese can copy our microchips, they can copy our smart bombs. Long-term stability depends on a coherent international order. Peaceful trade and mutual assurances of non-aggression would be a good start. It’s worked with China.

The United States should always maintain a strong defense. Woe to the nation or group that attacks us. Nations that do not threaten us directly, however, should not need to live in fear of an attack by the United States. It is not our job to liberate the oppressed of the world. Paraphrasing John Quincy Adams’ warning about needlessly seeking “monsters to destroy,” it seems better to lead by the example of our freedoms, rather than attempting to impose them on nations whose history and culture are fundamentally different from ours. Let other nations discover the best ways of adapting free markets and democracy to their institutions. Creative emulation on their part, encouraged by trade, would lead to growing freedom and prosperity. The natural patriotism of most peoples, however, leads them to resent foreign intervention, and to prefer a homegrown tyrant to even benign foreign rule.

Let’s not forget the burdens of nation building. Our economic prosperity depends on keeping the tax burden low, and deficits within

manageable limits. The Bush Doctrine is not a fiscally responsible policy, as there is no limit to the matériel and manpower needs of a military that must be ready to fight multiple wars simultaneously while engaging in nation building.

With regard to the potential threat posed by the Axis of Evil, there is little reason to suppose that a dictator, tyrant, or monarch will be more irrational, and less amenable to deterrence, than a democracy. The Soviet Union was deterred by our nuclear weapons. The late Iraqi regime did not use chemical weapons even during its last stand. Saddam was either deterred or he did not have them. Thus, deterrence was effective, or the U.N. inspections program worked. Either way, the Bush Doctrine's premises have been weakened.

In contrast, even functioning democracies can cause trouble, as in the simmering dispute between India and Pakistan. India is a democratic nation with a dangerous nuclear arsenal. Democracy alone is no guarantee of a secure, stable world. Attempting to impose it will not necessarily lead to the president's goal of stability and security. Defusing anti-American sentiment with a humble, even-handed, non-interventionist foreign policy will help, along with a vigorous policy of action against genuine terrorist threats.

A better goal would be containment of regimes trying to develop weapons of mass destruction, along with a curtailment of the global arms trade. Conventional weapons have proved to be more destructive than the

use of any weapons of mass destruction in history, except for the atomic bombs of August 1945.

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Refining Cruelty

Marvin Olasky

The essence of the Bush Doctrine is that it repeals the Sherman Doctrine. If handled adeptly, as it has been so far, the Bush Doctrine will make the United States and the world safer from terror.

The Sherman Doctrine was, "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it." That's what Union Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman told Atlanta officials in 1864. Sherman was a military innovator, consciously going against the tradition of not waging war on civilians. In 1863 his forces in Mississippi pillaged and burned towns. In 1864 in Georgia he ordered his men to "burn ten or twelve houses of known secessionists, kill a few at random, and let them know it will be repeated every time a train is fired upon."

In 1865 even one of Sherman's majors complained to his wife of "the frightful devastation our army was spreading" in South Carolina. "Women, children, and old men turned out into the mud and rain and their houses and furniture first plundered and then burned."

But I'm not condemning Sherman. Had his army not taken Atlanta, a war-weary, disunited Union might well have dumped Abraham Lincoln and given

the South independence. Had Sherman not shown a willingness to wage war on civilians, the surrender of Robert E. Lee might have been followed by years of guerrilla warfare.

Technological developments over the next century made war even crueler. The machine guns that first emerged during the Civil War became central to the trench slaughter of World War I. During World War II, Hitler took the Sherman Doctrine to its extreme by bombing the civilian populations of London and other cities. Later, American and British forces tried to break the German (and then the Japanese) will the same way. Regrettable, the Allies acknowledged, but what was the alternative? "War is cruelty. You cannot refine it."

At the height of the Cold War, the United States planned to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack with "mutual assured destruction." They wipe out our civilian population, we wipe out theirs. A "muscular" and "activist" foreign policy under those conditions meant brinkmanship, with civilian populations living under terror for years.

The Iraq war, though, showed that war can now be refined—and that's the essence of the Bush approach. Yes, civilian deaths sadly occurred, but destroyed military targets often sat next to undamaged civilian structures. An emphasis on speed, mobility, and flexibility allowed soldiers to go around potential dangers rather than roll over them.

The Bush Doctrine, which grows out of biblical compassion plus technological progress, is a recipe for neither per-

petual war nor perpetual peace, but for a long cold war against terrorism that will have many heated moments. President Bush and future leaders, if they stay the course, will ask other countries to destroy terrorist bases within their borders. If they don't act, the United States may do it for them, with minimal damage to civilian populations.

Regime change as in Iraq will be rare, and we should not assume that democracy will flourish. But regime flexibility could become common, as governments choose to face the anger of terrorists rather than the wrath of the United States. If the Bush Doctrine is wielded adeptly, terrorists will have fewer and fewer places to hide.

"War is cruelty. You cannot refine it." The Bush Doctrine is refinement.

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The End of Empty Threats and Empty Promises

Lisa Lebedoff Peilen

The Bush Doctrine will put an end to a disastrous period of American foreign policy, one in which our message was that there was no penalty for being an adversary of the United States because we were full of empty threats, but there was a huge penalty for being an ally of the United States because we were full of empty promises.

The new policy of "say what you mean and mean what you say" will help create a new environment of increased stability because our allies will realize they can rely on us, and our enemies will realize they can no longer operate with impunity.

Rulers such as Saddam Hussein are neither nationalists nor ideologues. They are committed only to the aggrandizement of their own power, and are sufficiently amoral to use any methods, no matter how odious, to achieve their goals. Not only do they not understand reason and decency, they see them as signs of weakness. What they respond to are strength, determination, and will. The fact that Saddam chose to ignore the American threat is testament to his not taking us seriously, to the belief that we would not back up our words with action.

As this is written, North Korea has at least begun negotiations with China and the United States. This is at least partially due to our invasion of Iraq (the other part is the fact that the Chinese cut off their oil supply to North Korea to demonstrate their seriousness of wanting talks to commence). Dictators such as Kim Jong Il will have to adjust their actions in view of a more limited sphere of operations that include both boundaries and consequences.

September 11 is the real catalyst for all of this, because it so clearly demonstrated that terrorists, whether heads of state or individuals, no longer need a standing army to inflict havoc on the world. There is no question in my mind that our new willingness to be both firm and clear in our response will help deter more terrorism. However, the long-term success of this policy would be greatly enhanced by our ability to help the Iraqi people put together a stable government. Should Iraq go

from one hostile regime to another, Americans will be less willing to support future preemptive strikes, which will, in turn, cripple our ability to deal with terrorists.

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The Bush Doctrine: Compared to What?

Sally C. Pipes

Like life itself, foreign policy is practiced forward but better understood backward. Those now attempting an evaluation of the foreign policy of the Bush administration should keep a key question in mind: compared to what? In the interest of fairness and civility, the Bush policy should not be compared to anybody's wish list or rhetoric, but to other actual foreign policies that have run their course, particularly the one that came before it.

Under President Bill Clinton, the United States suffered massive terrorist attacks but the response, outside of some random cruise missiles that failed to find their targets, was largely passive. This sent the clear message that one may bomb American assets and murder American citizens anywhere, at any time, without fear of retaliation.

The favored task for the U.S. military during the Clinton years was so-called peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Haiti, which would have been a better job for Canada or Norway. The United Nations was held in

the highest esteem. All this was a marked contrast to the Bush administration, which takes the same approach as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Foreign policy is largely a matter of communication and the active voice is more effective than the passive. Recall that when Argentina's military junta seized the British Falkland Islands, Margaret Thatcher knew that discussion of the issue with the generals would serve no purpose. Instead she sent the fleet, and the quick British victory hastened the fall of Argentina's military regime. Likewise, George Bush knew, even before September 11, that negotiation would not dissuade terrorists from their savagery. His administration did not indulge the absurd flagellation—so common on the left—that sought to explain mass murder through defects in American policy. It is to the president's credit that he ignores those who, as Jeane Kirkpatrick put it, "blame America first."

George W. Bush understands that America is the target of a jihad that demonizes democracy, freedom, and true diversity, the very qualities for which America stands. President Bush also understands that American prosperity also sparks the rage of terrorists and totalitarians alike. Given that understanding, the Bush foreign policy has been more realistic. Expansionist, sadistic dictators such as Saddam Hussein, the administration knew full well, would never heel to the United Nations nor roll over for genteel Scandinavian weapons inspectors. Dictators

do, however, understand military force, as is now fully evident.

Application of military force by the Bush administration has also removed the Taliban regime and eliminated the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. Combined with some long overdue domestic measures, it seems clear that the United States and the world are safer places because of these actions, even though attacks are most likely to happen again.

As we know from the Iraq campaign, even with precision munitions, war remains destructive and a leading cause of human misery. Military action is also a risky proposition, even with superior force. Small wars can easily become big wars. The president, on the other hand, is not engaging in hyperbole when he says that doing nothing is also risky.

A full assessment of the Bush administration foreign policy must wait until that policy has run its course, particularly with North Korea, Syria, and Iran. Even then, the record of the previous administration should be taken into account, along with other players. The burden of proof is on those who say that the Bush policy, which disdains the idea of sitting around and waiting to be attacked, has made the world a more dangerous place.

A stronger case can be made that increased danger from terrorism derives from passive foreign policy, along with inept bureaucracies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and misguided immigration policy in general. One cannot leave out the asylum and immigration policies of Canada,

which have made that nation, once a staunch ally of the United States, a launching platform for terrorist attacks. Acolytes of the United Nations, which did not stop Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait in the first place, might also attempt to show how this vaunted talk-shop has in any way diminished the threat of terrorism and made the world a safer place.

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The Challenge is in the Particulars

Tom Prichard

In the Minnesota state capitol, there are numerous quotes from famous people. Some pertain to war and peace. There's George Washington's quote, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving the peace." And then there is one by General Sherman: "War's legitimate object is more perfect peace."

President Bush has done an extraordinarily good job of preparing us for an unconventional war—a war not necessarily against a particular country (though that was certainly the case in the recent action with Iraq's dictatorship) but a war against radical, Islamic terrorists who move in and out of various countries.

As commander in chief, President Bush is duty bound to defend this nation and its people from those who would seek to destroy us. With the advent of weapons of unimaginable destructive capability, the effective waging of this war and winning it are

all the more imperative. Terrorists have already killed nearly 3,000 Americans, but their stated goal is to kill more, many more, Americans.

The challenge, of course, is in the particulars. President Bush has correctly recognized that to win this new war, individual terrorists must be deterred or eliminated. But just as importantly, the nations that support or encourage terrorists must be dissuaded from doing so. If they refuse to do so voluntarily, we must be willing to use the force necessary to stop them. That's why Iraq needed to be dealt with directly.

A problem in this war is that the lines are not drawn sharply among aggressors. A result of this grayness is that other nations (and even some American leftists) who view America as the primary source of evil in the world use the grayness as an opportunity to criticize and oppose direct military confrontation with nations aiding or covertly sponsoring terrorism.

On the international level, this makes the United Nations a hindrance to addressing the terrorist threat. How can one rely on an international organization made up of dictators—some of whom support terrorism—to address the very problems they perpetuate? A case in point is Syria. A blatant supporter of terrorism, Syria sits on the U.N. National Security Council. Or how about the repressive Libyan dictatorship—a past sponsor of terrorism—which chairs the U.N. Human Rights Commission?

President Bush has the very difficult task of developing independent coalitions and winning public support for

military actions against terrorist states before ultimately making the tough call of moving ahead with or without broad support from other nations. To date, President Bush has handled a nearly impossible task exceedingly well. He sought to build his case against Iraq and then appealed to the American people and the United Nations. When obstructionists at the United Nations refused to help, he then proceeded independently.

One nagging fear is that we may not ultimately win the race against time before another, possibly far worse, terrorist attack occurs on American soil. We live daily under a cloud of apprehension that individuals with weapons of mass destruction will use them against us before they can be stopped, because we failed to aggressively pursue them and the nations that support them. Again, we can use Syria as an example. Unfortunately, an unspeakable sequel to 9/11 may well be the motivation to move more aggressively against state sponsors of terrorism.

While critics of President Bush fault his “muscular” foreign policy, he really has no recourse but to aggressively and relentlessly move ahead because the consequence of merely hoping “things will somehow work out on their own” will play into the hands of those who are working to unleash unspeakable terror and horror upon us.

What must we—and more particularly our commander in chief—do? We must support an aggressive campaign against radical Islamic terrorists even when it’s not popular with the international community. And we must keep

in mind the comments of General Sherman, that military force is ultimately used in the pursuit of peace—a peace that may not come for some time. To reach this ultimate goal of peace, President Bush surely needs wisdom and our prayers.

Tom Prichard is president of the Minnesota Family Council.

The Security Imperative and the Moral Imperative

Brent Robbins

Americans, like all people, want security and expect their national leaders to do what is necessary to keep them safe.

More than any other nation, America was founded as an idea, not by a shared history, culture, or religion. The American Idea is that a people can co-exist, despite differences, based on a shared vision of liberty, self-government, and equal opportunity. Because we believe these ideas are universal, our foreign policy seeks to spread them.

These two strains of American foreign policy, which I’ll call the Security Imperative and the Moral Imperative, co-exist, but not equally. In the end, the American people will side with the Moral Imperative, but in moments of danger we may choose security.

Historically, America’s preference for the Moral Imperative may have been a luxurious choice. Now that America is the world’s sole superpower, employing the Moral Imperative, and convincing other nations that it is the correct worldview, is the linchpin of our security.

If America acted consistently with its short-term security interest (which would be opposed by most Americans), it could conquer much territory, govern whole nations, and bring great devastation to its enemies. But, the American Idea will flourish only if America stands for justice and prosperity—not just for security or, worse, for greed or imperialism. A muscular and activist America will engender fear or respect, not emulation.

Force is still necessary where evildoers directly threaten America. After September 11, we had no choice but to punish severely those responsible for those heinous acts. To have done otherwise would have convinced the wicked that America was there for the taking. In the unique post-9/11 circumstances, this manifestation of the Security Imperative caused no harm.

The Iraq war was a wholly different case. While there were persuasive arguments for the war (I was convinced), Iraq had done no immediate harm to America, and posed no catastrophic short-term threat. In the end, Gulf War II gained large support in America because of our heightened post-9/11 Security Imperative.

Some in the Bush Administration believe that the right prescription is to push for a maximal Security Imperative and use force, or the threat of force, to deal with Syria, North Korea, and even Iran. They argue this will lead people to the American Idea.

They couldn't be more wrong. Unlike the Roman Empire, which demanded obedience only to certain external rules, the American Idea

requires internalization. People will not come to the American Idea at the tip of the sword, but at the prick of their conscience. When faced with a muscular America seeking to infuse a nation with its Moral Imperative, people are likely to turn away.

The key principles are restraint, respect, and fair treatment. When the world sees a giant that could impose its will allow regional powers to flourish, it may be willing to embrace the Moral Imperative. When it sees a country that could easily build an empire, yet helps nations help themselves, it wants to be more like that nation.

We must vigorously pursue and punish all who pose a direct threat to America, but we need to do all we can to reassure the world of our good intentions. That means ensuring that our domestic values square with the ideas we wish to promote abroad. It means trusting our true allies and allowing them to lead. It also means more diplomacy and moral suasion. These measures must be backed by the strongest possible military, and the willingness to use it. But, force should be the last, not the preferred, option.

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We're the Mutts with the Constitution

Bruce C. Sanborn

We came from all over the world to be Americans. We are not kings or supermen. We're mutts, just as Bill Murray says in the movie *Stripes*, with a fighting faith and record of ten and one,

and that's not too shabby. Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom are history now, so playing off Bill's numbers, make that twelve and one.

America's saga of foreign affairs started back in 1776 when (in the vocabulary of those olden days) the mutts of America opened a can of whoopass on King George. We explained to a candid world that the king was acting like a despot, with a long train of abuses to his name. We detailed his abuses against us and the principles of natural right, which a good government is supposed to secure. Then we acted.

Eight score and nine years later, we traveled abroad and chased into a burning bunker Adolf Hitler, whose desire for a race of supermen to master and kennel the democracies was evident. Our war against him didn't really start with him attacking us; rather, he abused our friends and allied with the Japanese regime, which did attack us.

For as long as America has been on the world stage, our values have conflicted with tyrants. Sure, it's hard to account for some people's values. Some like gold-plated toilets installed in palaces built over torture chambers. Some thirst and burn for distinction and take their lame pleasure enslaving people to get it.

Accordingly, America has perpetually had to exercise prudence, the virtue that has us forever assessing whether the regimes of other nations wish and are able to cripple our constitutional way of life.

After enduring thirteen years of Saddam Hussein's abuse (starting with his

invasion of Kuwait), we determined we'd had enough. We had suffered through attacks on the U.S.S. *Cole* in Yemen, the U.S. embassies in Africa, the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, and the Pentagon. The leaders we elected to represent America determined that Saddam had effectively allied himself with the terrorists who murdered our citizens and his regime of terror possessed weapons harmful to Western civilization, our friends, and us.

Now, our leaders must gauge the intentions and abilities of nations like Syria, Iran, and North Korea as they respond to our action against Iraq. Moreover, our leaders must deal with the fact that Russia is the strongest military power in Europe, and that China is the strongest military power in Asia; that both are armed with strategic nuclear weapons; and that on July 16, 2001, the leaders of Russia and China "sealed a strategic partnership" and declared it "a milestone in the development of Russia-Chinese relations," and in doing so condemned the American plan for a missile-defense of the United States (as reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*).

Noteworthy also is Russia's having supplied Syria, Iran, and Iraq with arms and technology. Harold Rood (in *The War for Iraq: a Study in World Politic*, at www.claremont.org) observed that the year before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there were 16,660 Soviet and East European "economic technicians," 10,000 more from communist China, and 1,350 Soviet and East European "military technicians" in Iraq.

In April of this year London's *Telegraph* obtained top-secret documents in Baghdad showing Russia provided Saddam with wide-ranging assistance in the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, including intelligence on private conversations between Tony Blair and other Western leaders. Even as American troops moved on Baghdad this spring, Russian technicians were found on hand helping the Iraqis. The *Washington Post* reported on March 23 that Russians shipped night-vision goggles, missiles, and radar jamming devices to Iraq from at least June 2002 onward.

Professor Rood correctly cautions that Russia and China may merely seek influence and place among other powers with similar goals in the Middle East. Nonetheless, to recap: not all nations value the principles of democracy and mutts. Some would be masters and have brains and the latest technology. In politics, conflicts of values are hard to avoid and can be dangerous to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

Abraham Lincoln called the Declaration of Independence an apple of gold, in a picture of silver that is the Constitution. Notions and nations that threaten the principles of the Declaration and Constitution ought to be resisted. A foreign policy that assesses and protects—prudently and constitutionally—our strategic interests does three good things: keeps us safe, honors our principles, and reassures our friends. Certainly, preemption, unilateralism, muscularity, and spreading democracy and free enterprise are pos-

sible means worth discussing for securing our strategic interests. To the extent President Bush has been following this approach, this mutt agrees with him.

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WWCD: What would Churchill Do?

Rita J. Simon

The person who has been most in my mind since the Iraqi crisis emerged is Winston Churchill. In my reading of *The Gathering Storm*, I was so impressed by Churchill's warnings of the dangers of allowing Hitler and the Nazi Party to continue to engage in aggression against neighboring countries and to violate one treaty after another—acts his government and the rest of the world largely ignored. Did George W. Bush heed Winston Churchill warnings of 1938 and decide to act on them? I believe he did and his subsequent invasion of Iraq in April 2003 is in keeping with the policy Churchill would have adopted had he, and not Neville Chamberlain, been Britain's prime minister.

President Bush did not wait until France, Germany, Russia, and China agreed to join us, or even to endorse the United States action. With Britain as our major ally, the United States turned its back on the United Nations and acted on its own. Iraq and its leaders were a danger to world peace and before things got worse, we were going in to make them better.

We would not wait months, and then hear ourselves asking why we hadn't acted sooner? Why did we wait until Saddam Hussein did what we feared and warned he would do? Why are we now in a much worse situation than we would have been had we acted a few months earlier? George Bush had learned the sad lesson that appeasement of dictators doesn't make the world a safer or better place. He clearly recognizes that appeasement makes the world a more dangerous place.

Those in our country who warned that Iraq would become another Vietnam with American casualties in the thousands and the fighting going on for years have been proven wrong. A week into the war the dissenters in Congress and in the anti-war movement were laughing at Vice President Cheney telling us that we would be welcomed as liberators by the Iraqi people. A week later their silence was deafening.

As I write this piece, the war is coming to an end and the United States faces another immediate challenge. What, if anything, do we do about Syria? Suppose we have persuasive evidence that Saddam Hussein or his sons or other top leaders in the Iraqi government have been granted asylum in Syria? Does the United States cross the border into Syria to get them if the Syrian authorities refuse to turn them over? Or, let's consider another scenario. Suppose we are able to determine that Iraq moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria? If Syria refuses to hand them over or allow coalition forces to inspect, what happens next? Do the coalition forces

invade Syria? Will this become the U.S. strategy against terrorism? When does it end?

Many of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were from Saudi Arabia. What should our relations be with the Saudis? And how about the likelihood that Iran is producing chemical and biological or even nuclear weapons? Do we go into those countries and bring about changes in those governments? These are tough, realistic issues we may have to face not years from now, but in the next few weeks or months.

So far George W. Bush is taking the actions Winston Churchill would have taken, had he been in a position to do so.

Rita J. Simon is a University Professor in the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C.

The Inexorable Linking of Homeland and Security

Rich Stanek

Skepticism has an essential role in evaluation of any nation's foreign policy. It is equally important when analyzing the words of politicians, pundits, and critics.

Those who characterize President Bush's foreign policy as militarily top heavy do not give him proper credit for his diplomatic efforts, including laying out a detailed peace plan for the Middle East and ordering the removal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.

While the war against Iraq may have heightened hostility toward

America, the goal of freeing and helping to democratize a nation oppressed and brutalized by its government is noble. Bush administration initiatives to achieve peace in the Middle East may well prove to make the region and the world safer places.

A fundamental goal of the Bush administration, shared by leaders in all levels of government, is protecting citizens. This is a job that has changed considerably since the days before *homeland* and *security* became inexorably linked.

If a brawny military strategy plays a role in deterring terrorism, equally important are smart policies, effective intelligence, and a prepared nation. The Bush administration espouses all of these components, and most states are following suit.

The Minnesota Department of Public Safety is promoting programs by which we can make our state more secure. Among these measures is the inclusion of visa expiration dates on state identity documents issued to foreign visitors.

Some policymakers and advocacy groups charge that this policy unfairly targets immigrants when, in fact, it will not affect U.S. citizens or permanent U.S. residents, including immigrants and refugees. It only affects foreign visitors on temporary visas. And it will allow certain minimal controls over how the state's most important documents are obtained and used.

The debates over these issues will continue, but those of us who are charged with keeping our states and communities safe cannot stand by. We

must be ready for what the future brings; and most agree that a large-scale terrorist attack on America or American interests is all but inevitable.

Among our most important deterrence tools is the ability to share information. In Minnesota we are making groundbreaking progress in that respect as we build a network—known as CriMNet—that will enable 1,100 Minnesota law enforcement agencies, courts, and prisons to share fingerprints and photographic images and information on warrants, restraining orders, conviction, probation and incarceration status, and weapons prohibitions.

This project, which has the potential to allow data to be shared regionally or even nationally, will help law enforcement personnel track the activities of criminals, including those who would engage in terrorism.

In the event of a terrorist attack, the swiftest response will come from local agencies. Whether these first responders are prepared to mitigate a chemical attack, large explosion, or other catastrophic event will depend on the farsightedness of government.

We do not know the intended targets of future planned attacks; therefore, we must ensure that all of our nations' first responders have access to equipment and training that will help them minimize loss of life and property.

The Bush administration, through the Department of Homeland Security, recently provided states with new funding opportunities for precisely this type of preparedness.

Even in the event that foreign policy strategies, intelligence and enforce-

ment efforts, and perhaps diplomacy succeed in making the United States a less alluring target for groups such as Al-Qaida, the value of domestic preparedness will not be diminished.

Providing optimal training and equipment today will allow for fast and proficient response to tomorrow's disasters—whether they are natural or a product of human malfeasance.

Homeland security has emerged as a core function of government. And although it remains to be seen whether current policies will make our nation and communities safer, Bush and leaders in all levels of government must take deliberate actions—and perhaps some calculated risks—toward this end. The only consequence of which we can be certain is that complacency and inaction will leave us far too vulnerable in an increasingly dangerous world.

Rich Stanek is Minnesota's commissioner of public safety and the state's Homeland Security director.

The World Could Use a Leviathan

David Strom

Modern political thought can be said to begin with the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes, both of whom shared the insight that the foundation of all political order is unlimited and unchallenged power.

Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Hobbes' *Leviathan* were necessary because the state of nature is a state of anarchy, and in anarchy, chaos and injustice prevail. The sine qua non of

politics is the establishment of order. That's not to say that "might makes right," except in the sense that these philosophers believed our rights are meaningless without the ability to enforce them. Perhaps it's better to say "without might, there are no rights." Locke captured this idea perfectly when he demonstrated in his *Treatises* that politics properly understood is the establishment of order through force, in the service of natural human rights.

Any political order—no less a just and lasting order—has as its foundation the ability to enforce the rules. Our liberal regime, based on the protection of our natural human rights, is one of the few regimes in the world to be able to (more or less) consistently enforce the rules as we understand them, and the result of that success has been a remarkably stable and prosperous nation that serves as a beacon of freedom and prosperity to the rest of the world.

Our freedom, our prosperity, our rights, and our military might are all part and parcel of the same regime. It is no accident that the United States stands as the sole superpower in the world. Our military might is both a cause and a result of our economic and social might. Our regime is powerful because it is just, and it is just because it can and does effectively enforce the rules we live by—both within our borders, and across the world. For the United States, interestingly enough, experience has shown that right makes might.

Unfortunately, it's obvious that we

are the exception and not the rule in the world. Whether it is rogue nations such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or any of the myriad other outlaw states, or simply the impotence of our multinational institutions to keep the peace, it is clear that there is no great power to keep the peace and enforce the rules in the international “community.”

It's clear that the world could benefit from a Leviathan to enforce the rules. And it's clear than no one else is either in the position to assume that role, or better equipped morally than the United States to do so. Our exercise of power has been almost exclusively in the service of a more just world order.

Even in the short time since September 11, U.S. assertiveness has had its intended effects. At no point since the 1960s has terrorist activity been so low.

Prudence might dictate staying out of some international conflicts. But common sense and morality clearly tell us that it is not only right, but beneficial to all to have the United States “police” the world.

If not us, then who?

David Strom is legislative director of the Taxpayers League of Minnesota

Diplomacy as a Last Resort

Terry Thompson

Hand-carried signs in many of the anti-war demonstrations that prefaced the Iraq war were more simplistic than thought provoking, but they did declare almost universal uneasiness with the foreign policy of this country and its

ongoing campaign to defeat terrorism.

“Bush is a weapon of mass destruction,” one read. Another said, “Stop terrorism. Stop US.” Outrageous or not, some signs—and even polls—suggested that President Bush was a greater threat to peace than Saddam Hussein.

A variation on these themes was evidenced worldwide, as millions of people in Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, and other countries long considered our allies marched in a display that was ultimately ineffectual. Still, certain echoes linger.

Antiwar rallies do not have the authority of an executive order or a senator's vote. After all, President Bush likened the demonstrations to a focus group, a Madison Avenue concoction frequently used to predict acceptance of new products. In dismissal of the protesters, the message was don't trust groupthink, particularly if the sentiment is messy and runs counter to your cherished beliefs.

We got to this surety in quick order, immediately after 9/11, and one of the reasons is fear. A public that is willing to trust the propaganda of a wartime government, dispensed freely, responds often out of fear. There is nothing sinister in any of this, but leadership should be able to step back from the moment, calm the anxieties of the American people, and try to envision a way in the world that understands the true interdependence of nations.

This is my quarrel with our foreign policy and what is now its central justification, the war on terrorism. With Saddam Hussein banished and his

palaces in ruins, with Wall Street catching a second wind and the Pentagon staring down Syria, Iran, and North Korea (one down and three to go), it's easy to forget the abiding fears of millions of people around the world over the direction of this country.

We seem to be a country that is now willing to use diplomacy as a last resort. In the ramp-up to the Iraqi war, President Bush was singularly unconvincing in his assertions that he had not made up his mind, that war was his very final consideration. There is evidence now that the decision to go to Iraq was made shortly after 9/11. The yearning-for-peace rhetoric, when it defies reality, is double-talk that many Americans distrust. They perceive a country with a foreign policy of "ready, fire, aim." Multilateral diplomacy in North Korea notwithstanding, there is a belief that we are not just strong but arrogant, not only single-minded but eagerly preemptive. We will pick our battles when and where we choose. The American ideal is transportable and easily assembled; so get out of the way.

The anticipated riots in the "Arab street" did not materialize post war, and we have been spared retaliatory terrorist strikes against our homeland. Still, the future of Iraq remains open to question. These are early days, and the preemptive determinism of the United States runs the risk of creating distrust and hatred everywhere. Our unilateralism, especially when coupled with zeal, can be dangerous to world order. It threatens now to harm irreparably the United Nations, and it has as a by-product deepening schisms in Europe,

where many of our most valuable friends are, including France. Progress in resolving the Israel-Palestine problem may have been slowed by our foray into Iraq.

The foreign policy of the United States and its campaign to halt the spread of terrorism needs more than a second look. It needs an infusion of wisdom and a new vision that recognizes that all the nations of the world are in this together. The United States, in its conduct of foreign policy, needs a better plan.

Terry Thompson is a writer, teacher, and former communications officer for General Mills and Pillsbury. ■

Visionary Varnish on the Big Stick

D.J. Tice

In February I enjoyed a Lincoln's Birthday dinner with several stimulating conservative thinkers. The national debate over America's newly visionary foreign policy reminds me that I tasted that evening a sample of the idealistic, crusading spirit that today inspires many American conservatives. It's the state of mind widely labeled "neoconservative" of late—aptly or not.

I had written a Lincoln column that day. I'd focused on the greatest American's devotion to the rule of law, reflecting that while Lincoln's hatred of slavery was strong, he waged Civil War to save America's constitutional order.

One companion objected to this

humble view of Lincoln's motives. He insisted that the moral imperative to abolish slavery fueled Lincoln's determination. For this conservative, a Lincoln not consumed by a higher moral mission, but mainly committed to fulfilling his oath of office, would be no special hero.

The subject turned to the impending war in Iraq and America's mission in the world. Several dinner mates eloquently endorsed the Bush administration's stated vision—that America can and should bring, not just stability, but democracy and modernity to the Middle East and beyond.

But what, I asked, if people in Islamic countries or elsewhere don't want democracy and modernity? What if their religious and cultural values support some other social order?

The answer seemed to be that human beings are all children of the same creator, destined to inherit individual liberty. ("God's gift to humanity," President Bush has called it.) History's inexorable erosion of oppressive social systems may simply need to be speeded up in some places—and American power can be the accelerant.

I've been chewing on those ideas ever since that dinner. This meaty discussion is further proof that the most challenging and important debates in America today are happening within the conservative movement.

There is certainly something to digest when conservatives proclaim a higher moral mission to "make the world not just safer but better," as Bush's September 2002 National Security Strategy puts it.

Traditionally, conservatives were just those people who were content to make the world "safer," to protect America's "interests," and who saw hubris and hazard in the attempt to force American "values" into inhospitable places.

The late Russell Kirk, author of the seminal *The Conservative Mind*, and a sure guide to classical conservative attitudes, warned against an "insidious ... imperialism, applauded rather than denounced by humanitarians, a resolution that all the world should be induced to embrace American principles and modes of life, founded on the immense presumption that American society is the final, superior product of human ingenuity."

Fewer conservatives worry about "immense presumption" these days. As Kirk and other conservatives of his generation feared, America's twentieth-century confrontations with rival value systems that sought to impose worldwide tyranny may have finally convinced the entire nation, conservatives included, that America must itself reshape the whole world. American democracy will be safe, in this view, only when the whole globe is "safe for democracy."

Conservatives still want little to do with leagues of nations (or United Nations). Otherwise, Woodrow Wilson's view of America's limitless calling has prevailed.

A Bush administration envoy told Iraqis recently: "We want you to establish your own democratic system based on Iraqi traditions and values." That sounds a little like Henry Ford, who

famously offered customers a Model T in any color they liked—"as long as it's black."

The *New York Times'* conservative commentator William Safire recently described America's new security policy as (think about this) "preemption as a last resort." That sounds a little like George Orwell.

The *Times'* liberal columnist Nicholas Kristof recently applauded the new "conservative idealists" (see Kirk's prediction above) but suggested that American success in the Arab world won't be complete until all Arab societies give women the vote and discard extreme sexual modesty (while preserving Islamic traditions, no doubt).

That sounds a little like, well, immense presumption.

It is possible to see everything the Bush administration has done so far in the "war on terror" as pragmatic. It has eliminated selected threats with force,

and in the process scared some sense into other hostile regimes. Perhaps the messianic rhetoric is mainly visionary varnish on big-stick foreign policy.

There is nothing *un*conservative or unwelcome about America trying to help establish more decent governments everywhere—and to nourish modern, democratic social systems wherever they authentically fit local traditions and values.

But if there are conservatives who believe that America's "nation building" must always mean building nations that broadly "embrace American modes of life"—well, in that case we conservatives have more thinking and talking to do.

D.J. Tice is a columnist and editorial writer at the St. Paul Pioneer Press. A slightly different version of this essay appeared in the newspaper in April.