New Iraqi inspections are almost certain to fail

Star Tribune
October 9, 2002
Katherine Kersten

In recent months, we've heard alarming evidence that Saddam Hussein is developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Many -- including our European allies and some congressional leaders -- insist that U.N. inspections are the best way to counter this threat, and that military force must be a last resort. But unless the United Nations radically reforms the inspections process, inspections are doomed to fail.

In a recent article in Commentary magazine, two arms control monitors tell us why. "Iraq: The Snare of Inspections" is by Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz -- both analysts with the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which is affiliated with the University of Wisconsin. Their article explains why the current U.N. inspection process is wholly inadequate to the task of unmasking Saddam's menacing weapons programs.

Milhollin and Motz point out that if U.N. inspectors return to Iraq, they will not simply pick up where their predecessors left off four years ago. Today's inspection apparatus -- the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) -- is a far weaker body than the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), which operated from 1991 to 1998. The United Nations created UNMOVIC (which has yet to take the field) in 1999, when Security Council resolve about confronting Iraq was at a low point. As a result, the new agency incorporates a number of Saddam's central demands.

During its seven-year tenure in Iraq, UNSCOM was fairly successful at detecting Saddam's chemical and biological weapons. In part, this was because it operated outside the United Nations' grossly inefficient bureaucracy. UNSCOM arms inspectors were highly qualified experts, on loan from national governments. To evaluate Saddam's Scuds, for example, UNSCOM bypassed scientists with a general knowledge of rocketry, and recruited experts who knew Scuds firsthand.

UNMOVIC will be part of the labyrinthine U.N. bureaucracy, and will have a "college of commissioners" -- made up of career diplomats, not arms experts -- who must approve its decisions. Unlike UNSCOM, UNMOVIC will draw its inspectors only from the ranks of U.N. employees. As a result, many highly qualified arms experts will be ineligible to serve.

UNMOVIC will also differ from UNSCOM in stressing "geographic balance" over inspectors' technical expertise. Some inspectors are likely to have little experience with the weapons systems they are evaluating, since their own countries do not possess them. Worse yet, UNMOVIC will not require its inspectors to complete a security clearance process. Iraqi infiltration -- a problem in the past -- is highly likely.

In Iraq, UNMOVIC's novice inspectors will face a daunting challenge. Many of Saddam's weapons facilities are well hidden: behind private villas, under hospitals, or in underground, lead-lined "wells." Others are highly mobile, and can be moved by truck at a moment's notice. (Recall that even Hans Blix, UNMOVIC's chairman, failed to detect Iraq's massive nuclear program when he headed the International Atomic Energy Agency before the Gulf war.) Milhollin and Motz sum it up this way: UNMOVIC inspectors will be "a team of rookies going to bat against a world-class intelligence organization highly practiced at foiling inspections."

To find and evaluate Saddam's weapons programs, UNMOVIC will have to rely -- as UNSCOM did -- on intelligence from friendly countries. Yet few countries are likely to give much sensitive information to UNMOVIC. The United States, Britain and Israel willingly shared with UNSCOM, because they could give secret information (on a "privileged" basis) to individual inspectors whom they trusted to protect it and use it aggressively. But UNMOVIC will not allow such "privileged" sharing. Given the new agency's security flaws, few nations are likely to take the risk.

UNMOVIC will also discourage information sharing in another way. Unlike UNSCOM, it will not let nations know how it is using the intelligence that they share. Consequently, donor governments will not know if their tips lead to new information, and they won't be allowed to help analyze new findings. As a result, these governments will be unwilling to trust the accuracy of UNMOVIC's reports.

Advocates of inspections claim that a preemptive military strike against Saddam would be rash. They insist that the prudent course is to send inspectors back to Iraq. Ironically, however, UNMOVIC's inspections are likely to produce very dangerous consequences.

Given its flaws, UNMOVIC will almost certainly fail to uncover the nature and extent of Saddam's weapons programs. Furthermore, UNMOVIC officials will probably hesitate to report Iraq's failures to cooperate, since this -- by itself -- could trigger a war. As a result, the international community will be lulled into a false sense of security. Pressure will build to lift the embargo on Iraq. And in two or three years, we may see -- to our horror -- Saddam's use of a deadly virus or a nuclear bomb.

-Katherine Kersten is a senior fellow of the Center of the American Experiment in Minneapolis.